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Abstract 
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) is the first level of appeal for an asylum seeker whose 
application has been rejected by the Department of Home Affairs. There have been allegations that 
appointments at the AAT have become politicised. Despite these concerns, there exists no empirical 
means to test political influence at the AAT. This thesis develops a method to quantitatively test these 
allegations and provide further insights into asylum decision-making. Drawing off a specially generated 
Database of all publicly available refugee decisions at the AAT for the years 2015-2018 (2,272 cases), 
this study measures the effect of the Party appointing each Member on asylum outcomes. The key 
finding is that the odds of a Labor-appointed Member giving a favourable decision to an asylum-seeker 
were 1.46 times higher than those of a Liberal-appointed Member. Further, this study finds that the 
decision patterns vary significantly between Labor- and Liberal-appointed Members for applications 
from the same country of origin.  
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Introduction 
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the AAT) is the first avenue of appeal for persons seeking 
asylum in Australia. Its purpose is to allow an independent decision-maker (a Member) to remake the 
decision of the Department of Home Affairs (the Department). In May 2017, the Immigration Minister 
of Australia, Peter Dutton, criticised the AAT for handing down several controversial decisions 
favourable to asylum seekers. Dutton suggested the decisions were made by Members with links to the 
Labor Party.1 The comments were met with swift backlash from the Opposition and from the Law 
Council of Australia, which released the following statement; 
“The Administrative Appeals Tribunal plays a critical role in overseeing and reviewing 
decisions made by Federal Government ministers, departments, and agencies every day. 
For members to face personal criticism for fulfilling their duties is inappropriate. They 
are reviewing decisions made by government in accordance with law, not personal 
preference or ideology.” (emphasis added)2 
One month later, the Coalition government refused to renew the contracts of over 50 AAT Members, 
most of whom sat in the Migration and Refugee Division.3 The government also appointed over 60 new 
Members to the Tribunal.4 Several of the new appointees were accused of having links to the Liberal 
Party. Amongst the appointees were ex-political staffers and Liberal Senate candidates.5 In February 
2019, an additional swathe of appointments was labelled with similar accusations from the media,6 from 
legal professional groups,7 and from the Labor Party.8  
 
1 Caitlyn Gribbin, "Peter Dutton blames 'politics' as bid to deport six refugees fails," ABC News, 16 May 2017 
2017. 
2 Law Council of Australia, "Minister’s comments attacking independence of tribunal were unfortunate, should 
not be repeated," news release, 17 May 2017, 2017. 
3 Michael Koziol, "George Brandis clears out 'infuriating' Administrative Appeals Tribunal," Sydney Morning 
Herald, 28 June 2017 2017. 
4 Ben Doherty, "Refugee tribunal members lose contracts after Peter Dutton criticisms," The Guardian, 2 June 
2017 2017. 
5 Koziol, "George Brandis clears out 'infuriating' Administrative Appeals Tribunal."; Mard Di Stefano, "How 
The Attorney General Stacked An Independent Tribunal With His Liberal Mates," 3 November 2016 2016; 
Justine Landis-Hanley David Hardaker, "The Big Stack; How the goernment stacked the AAT,"  (24 September 
2019 2019). 
6 Paul Karp, "‘Full of Liberal mates’: Labor accuses Coalition of 'stacking' tribunal," 21 February 2019 2019. 
7 Law Council of Australia, "AAT appointments must be transparent and merit-based," news release, 22 
February 2019, 2019. 
8 Michaela Whitbourn, "Federal Labor vows to end political appointments to AAT,"  (2 February 2019 2019). 
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Over this same period (2015-2018) the number of active refugee cases awaiting review in the 
Refugee Division of the AAT ballooned from 5,434 to over 20,000, due to both an increase in the 
number of asylum applicants9 and also dramatic changes in the asylum processing laws in late 2014.10 
Concurrently, there were several highly politicised High Court cases that challenged aspects of the 
asylum regime in Australia.11 These cases all arose from decisions that were initially made at the AAT 
and are part of a larger to-and-fro between the High Court and the legislature regarding refugee policy.12 
The AAT is statutorily required to be “just” and “fair”.13 The core values of the Code of Conduct for 
AAT Members are ‘independence’, ‘impartiality’ and ‘integrity’.14 Accusations of politicised 
appointments, ideological decision making, a drastic increase in its workload and the politicisation of 
its decisions have put these principles in jeopardy. This context gives rise to the central research 
question: “To what extent can outcomes of asylum applications between 2015 and 2018 in the AAT be 
explained by Members’ political preferences?” The question is fundamentally an empirical one and 
therefore is answered using a quantitative method to measure political influence at the AAT. I create a 
Database of refugee cases at the AAT, and use statistical analysis to ascertain differences in how 
Liberal- and Labor-appointed Members make decisions.  
Scholarship on the AAT is primarily from legal literature and focuses on the peculiar position of the 
AAT as a pseudo-judicial body (discussed below). The literature on judicial behaviour, which seeks to 
understand how ideological and institutional factors affect decisions, has generally overlooked the 
AAT. Whilst there is a young but growing literature on administrative asylum decision-making in 
 
9 AAT, Annual Report 2016-17,  (Canberra 2017); AAT, MRD refugee caseload summary by country of 
reference,  (Canberra 2019).  
10 Mary Crock and Kate Bones, "Australian Exceptionalism: Temporary Protection and the Rights of Refugees," 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 16, no. 2 (2015). RCOA, State of the Nation: Refugees and People 
Seeking Asylum in Australia, Refugee Council of Australia (Surry Hills: Refugee Council of Australia, 2017). 
11 High Court in Plaintiff M68/2015 v. Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Ors [2016] HCA 1; 
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v 
WZARH [2015] HCA 40; BEG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 3. 
12 Rebecca Hamlin, Let me be a refugee : administrative justice and the politics of asylum in the United States, 
Canada, and Australia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Rebecca Hamlin, "International Law and 
Administrative Insulation: A Comparison of Refugee Status Determination Regimes in the United States, 
Canada, and Australia," Law & Social Inquiry 37, no. 4 (2012). 
13 Administrative Appeals Act (Cth) 1975, s 2A.  
14 AAT, Conduct Guide for AAT Members,  (Canberra: Commonwealth, 2015). 
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Canada15 and the USA,16 such studies have not yet been conducted in Australia. The Migration and 
Refugee Division (MRD) of the AAT is therefore an institution that has received little academic 
scrutiny, but heavy criticism in the media and political spheres. It is an interesting subject of analysis 
as it sits at the nexus of several politically relevant issues: international migration, the expansion of 
executive power, the undermining of the separation of powers and the rule of law, and the increasing 
securitisation and criminalisation of refugee policy. 
AIMS 
This project is grounded in legal realism: the acknowledgement that the reasons for a decision-
maker’s decision are not simply those that are listed in their published written reasons.17 By approaching 
a study of the AAT from a political science perspective, this project aims to investigate whether asylum 
decision-making is affected by the Member’s political attitudes and whether the appointment process 
is politicised. This thesis does by no means aim to provide a totalising theory on how decisions are 
made.  It does not measure the influence of institutional or other structural political influences on 
decision-making. Such an aim lies outside the scope of this project. Rather, due to the lack of academic 
understanding of the AAT, this project aims to test a single theory on decision-making (the attitudinal 
school) using a quantitative method.  
The second aim of this thesis is to consider and synthesise the literature that surrounds the tribunal. 
As a pseudo-judicial body that is part of the executive, the AAT is relevant to the literature on both 
judicial behaviour theory, and also administrative studies more broadly. There has been little attempt 
in Australia to consider the AAT through either of these paradigms. This thesis therefore presents an 
 
15 Sean Rehaag, "Do women refugee judges really make a difference? An empirical analysis of gender and 
outcomes in Canadian refugee determinations," Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 23, no. 2 (2011); 
Sean Rehaag, "The Role of Counsel in Canada's Refugee Determination System: An Empirical Assessment," 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 49, no. 1 (2011); Sean Rehaag, "Judicial review of refugee determinations: the luck 
of the draw?," Queen's Law Journal 38, no. 1 (2012). 
16 Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Refugee roulette : disparities in asylum adjudication and proposals for reform, ed. 
Andrew Ian Schoenholtz and Philip G. Schrag (New York: University Press, 2009); Jaya Ramji-Nogales, 
Andrew Schoenholtz, and Philip Schrag, "Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication," Stanford Law 
Review 60, no. 2 (2007); Banks Miller, Linda Camp Keith, and Jennifer S. Holmes, Immigration Judges and 
U.S. Asylum Policy (Philadelphia: DE GRUYTER, 2015). 
17 Grant Gilmore, "Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure," Yale Law Journal 70, no. 7 (1961). 
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opportunity to extend and develop the literatures on decision-making by applying them to the AAT; a 
hybrid institution. 
Finally, this thesis aims to produce and analyse new data on refugee decisions at the AAT.  I code 
every publicly available refugee decision made by the AAT between July 2015 and December 2018 
(2,544 decisions), recording the applicant’s country of origin, the name of the Member, and the date, 
location and outcome of the decision.  This will be accompanied by an additional Member database, 
which records the name of the Member and the government that appointed him or her to the Tribunal. 
These data enable an analysis of trends in decision-making and most importantly, whether patterns arise 
as to how Members appointed by different political parties are making decisions. This quantitative 
assessment also includes a regression analysis, to determine the strength of the relationship between the 
outcome of a case and the political party appointing the Member, whilst controlling for other variables. 
In addition, this project considers the pre-existing data on the AAT, in order to contextualise my data 
and compare it to the universe of decisions.  
OVERVIEW OF THESIS 
Chapter one contextualises the political and theoretical debates surrounding refugee determination 
at the AAT. The first section gives an overview of the AAT and seeks to define its key features and 
purpose. The second section considers the theory surrounding the AAT from different schools, 
including the administrative and judicial behaviour literatures and the asylum decision-making theory.  
Chapter two explains and justifies the method of this project, including the creation of the Refugee 
Decision Database (the Database). 
Chapter three presents the results of the quantitative data analysis of the Database. This includes the 
use of descriptive statistics, cross-tabulation and logistic regression analysis to determine correlations 
and test the hypothesis.  
Chapter four presents the results of this data analysis and discusses the conclusions. This section 
seeks to answer the core inquiry of this study: to what extent can outcomes of asylum applications 
11 
 
between 2015 and 2018 in the AAT be explained by Members’ political influences? It also locates the 
findings with the literature on decision-making and in political science more broadly.  
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1 Context and Theory 
1.1 THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL 
In order to contextualise the forthcoming analysis, it is important to understand the AAT’s history 
and its role in Australia’s migration regime. The AAT is the first avenue of appeal for an asylum seeker 
in Australia. After an applicant’s request for a humanitarian protection visa has been denied by the 
Department of Home Affairs (the Department18), the applicant may apply for a review of the decision 
‘on its merits’. This means that the decision is to be re-made by a Member of the AAT, using the same 
information that is available to the Department. The Member is also, however, able to conduct a hearing, 
has the opportunity to interview the applicant and is also able to request new information or documents. 
The purpose of merits review at the AAT (as opposed to judicial review at the Federal Court), is to 
ensure that the initial decision-maker from the Department determined the facts of the case correctly. 
Where the applicant believes the decision was not made in accordance with law, the applicant is able 
to seek judicial review at the Federal Circuit Court. The application and appeal process are shown in 
Figure 1.  
The AAT was instituted in 1976 in response to the increasing power of the state. Throughout the 
20th Century, the responsibilities of the Executive branch of government grew considerably. 
Commonwealth departments became accountable for making decisions on how government services 
should be delivered to individuals (eg. welfare, veterans support, housing, healthcare, taxation) and also 
controlled how people entered and exited the country through migration and citizenship powers. Under 
common law, the means of appealing such decisions was vague, slow and outdated. It relied on several 
constitutionally entrenched writ, with cases often being lost or won on the basis of legal technicalities.19 
The Kerr Report of 1971, tasked with assessing the process of review of government decisions, 
recognised that what the aggrieved person really wanted was to review the decision on its merits (as 
opposed to a review on a question of law), and for the decision to be made again.20 Such a consolidated 
 
18 Previously, the Department of Immigration and Border Protection. 
19 Administrative Review Committee, Report of the Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee, ed. John 
Kerr, Parliamentary paper / Australia. Parliament ; PP 144/71., (Canberra: Govt. Printer, 1971), [58]. 
20 Ibid. 
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body did not exist in Australia nor any other common law nation. In 1976, the AAT was established as 
a centralised review tribunal that aimed to provide “effective, independent and visible review of all 
appropriate decisions and to ensuring consistency of review standards across all jurisdictions.”21  
Figure 1 Diagram of refugee application process. 
 
The founding President of the AAT noted that at its founding, the AAT was novel as it straddled the 
judicial and executive branches. He recognises that the body could have followed the administrative 
model to become a “higher tier of bureaucracy” – essentially a rubber stamp for government decisions. 
Alternatively, it could follow the judicial model, “which would mark it as something standing outside 
the bureaucracy and beyond ministerial power to prescribe the policy it was to follow.”22 He continues, 
“It is no secret that the AAT followed the judicial method, nor that the period of my presidency was 
one in which that model was adhered to closely.”23 Due to this judicial method, the AAT, whilst being 
an executive institution, has also been heavily influenced by the norms of the judiciary: independence, 
autonomy, impartiality, non-partisanship, procedural justice, jurisprudence constante (the notion that 
 
21 Ibid. 
22 Gerard Brennan, "Opening Address" (The AAT, twenty years forward: papers presented at a conference to 
mark the twentieth anniversary of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 1-2 July 1996, Canberra, Australian 
Institute of Administrative Law, 1998). (emphasis added) 
23 Ibid. 
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previous decisions are persuasive but not determinative on subsequent cases dealing with similar factual 
scenarios), conforming to statute, and consistency.24 These norms have become definitive of the AAT. 
Indeed, they are explicitly mentioned in the code of conduct, which Members are statutorily required 
to abide by.25 In summary, therefore, the AAT’s purpose is to hold Executive departments accountable 
by providing an avenue of review for persons aggrieved by government decisions, such that their case 
could be re-determined far from the political influence present in executive departments.  
In July 2019, a comprehensive review into the AAT was publicly released (the Callinan Report).26 
The report, conducted by former High Court Justice, Ian Callinan, was statutorily sanctioned and 
Callinan had wide statutory powers to investigate and collect interviews and input from interest groups. 
Amongst other things, the Report noted the drastic changes in application numbers, the increasing 
backlog of cases and the political turbulence in refugee policy.27 Whilst a review of political matters 
was outside the terms of reference of the report,28 the Callinan Report documents concerns of political 
influence from several stakeholders, including the Law Council of Australia,29  community legal 
centres,30 the public sector union,31 and even anonymous sitting Members of the AAT.32 In summary, 
the Report found that the AAT is underfunded, suffers from administrative and legal inefficiencies, and 
is “not always meeting community expectations”. 
In light of the institutional turbulence and accusations of political interference mentioned above, 
there is a clear rationale for this project. It aims to take the first academic steps in considering whether 
the AAT is functioning in line with its purpose and foundational principles.   
 
24 Erik Bleich, "Historical Institutionalism and Judicial Decision-Making," World Politics 70, no. 1 (2018): 65. 
25 AAT, Conduct Guide for AAT Members. 
26 Ian Callinan, Statutory Review of the Tribunals Amalgamation Act 2015 (Attorney-General’s Department, 23 
July 2019 2019). 
27 Ibid. 
28 Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) Statutory Review: Terms of Reference,  (2018). 
29 Callinan, Statutory Review of the Tribunals Amalgamation Act 2015, 102. 
30 Ibid, 107.  
31 Ibid, 91. 
32 Ibid, 121-22. 
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1.2 THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
This study implicates two fundamental principles that underpin the structure of democratic 
government: the separation of powers and the rule of law. Since the writings of Locke and Montesquieu, 
the separation of the executive, legislative and judicial powers has been recognised as an essential 
ingredient for democratic states.33 The principle is necessary for preventing the holders of power from 
denigrating and usurping the checks and balances that constrain their ability to exercise that power. As 
a ‘check’ on the decision-making power of the executive, the AAT should be insulated from political 
interference and manipulation. Allegations that both Liberal and Labor governments are manipulating 
the AAT by appointing Members who are politically aligned with their policies undermines this 
separation of powers and opens the door to the unchecked exercise of power by the Department.  
The rule of law, at its most basic level, is the concept that citizens are able to know and obey the 
law, whilst the government enforces it equally and fairly. The rule of law touches on many sub-concepts 
(Bingham recognises eight separate ‘sub-rules’).34 The most relevant to this investigation is the 
requirement that ‘legal right and liability be resolved by application of the law and not the exercise of 
discretion.’35 There is an obvious and dangerous departure from this principle where an asylum 
application is determined by the political preferences of the decision-maker, rather than by assessing 
whether the applicant’s circumstances meet the legal conditions for being a refugee. The importance of 
these two principles in maintaining a balanced democracy and system of government cannot be 
understated. Collectively, they ensure the people can trust government decision-making and prevent the 
arbitrary exercise of power. This study works within this broader theoretical context, as it seeks to 
uncover the presence of political influence which threatens the rule of law and the separation of powers.   
 
 
33 Malcolm P. Sharp, "The Classical American Doctrine of" The Separation of Powers"," The University of 
Chicago Law Review 2, no. 3 (1935). 
34 Lord Bingham, "The rule of law," The Cambridge Law Journal 66, no. 1 (2007). 
35 Ibid, 72. 
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1.3 THEORY REVIEW 
If one starts from the assumption that decision-makers are influenced by factors beyond the written 
laws, regulations and policies, the question arises as to what factors are most influential? The AAT 
provides an interesting case study to answer this question, as it sits in between the judicial and executive 
branches of government. There exists a large body of ‘judicial behaviour’ literature, which seeks to 
explain how judges come to their final decisions by looking beyond the written reasons given in 
judgements, generally referring to individual and structural accounts. There also exists an extensive 
literature from the school of administrative studies, which investigates how public officials exercise 
their discretion. This thesis aims to acknowledge the insights into decision-making given by both of 
these approaches, in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of the factors that influence 
refugee decisions in the AAT.  
1.3.1 Judicial Behaviour 
Whilst decision-makers at the AAT are ‘Members’ rather than ‘judges’, the theories from the judicial 
behaviour literature are still applicable. The task of a judge and a Member is fundamentally the same. 
Both roles involve the close analysis of a factual scenario and the application law to those facts in order 
to resolve a dispute. Both judges and Members have the opportunity to ask questions to the aggrieved 
parties, question witnesses and examine evidence. Additionally, and as noted above in the section 1.1, 
the AAT took on the foundational institutional principles of the judiciary. Members can therefore be 
measured against the same standards of impartiality and independence.  
There are three primary strands of theory on how judges make their decisions; the legal, attitudinal 
and institutional models. The legal model posits that judges make decisions according to precedent, the 
plain meaning of statutes, and the intent of the framers of statutes.36 This position (also known as legal 
formalism in legal scholarship) remains the most accepted explanation for judicial behaviour in legal 
circles. The rise of legal realism in the 1920’s, however, cast significant doubt over the accuracy of 
legal formalism as an explanation for judicial behaviour. Legal realism recognises that judges’ decisions 
 
36 See for example, Howard Gillman, "What's law got to do with it? Judicial behavioralists test the “legal 
model” of judicial decision making," Law & Social Inquiry 26, no. 2 (2001). 
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are not the product of the simple application of law to facts. In his reflections on the movement, Grant 
in 1961 describes the position: 
A judge's holding in a case is an ad hoc response to a unique state of facts, rationalized, after 
the event, with a dissimulation more or less conscious, and fitted willy-nilly into the 
Procrustean bed of approved doctrine. The motivations of the judicial response are buried, 
obscure, unconscious and - even to the judge - unknowable.37 
Grant’s words are the starting point for the attitudinal and institutional schools of judicial behaviour, 
which seek to explain judicial decisions by uncovering the ‘obscure’ and ‘unconscious’ motivations 
behind the judicial response to refugee decisions. 
1.3.1.1 Attitudinal Model 
The attitudinal model, also called the ideological approach, proposes that decision-makers determine 
cases according to their policy preferences.38 This thesis will test whether the attitudinal theory of 
decision-making can explain outcomes at the AAT. Under this understanding, a judge with conservative 
views would make decisions that align with a conservative ideology and vice versa. This theoretical 
approach has been pioneered by Segal and Spaeth in the US Supreme Court who developed a 
comprehensive database of Supreme Court decisions.39 Scholars from the attitudinal school have 
generally found empirical support for their hypothesis that a judge’s ideology is determinative of his or 
her decision at both Federal and Supreme Court levels.40 The attitudinal theorists have also sought to 
explain judicial outcomes based on the demographic features of either the judge or the litigants 
themselves, including race, gender or religion.41 There is, however, little conclusive evidence of a causal 
 
37 Gilmore, "Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure." 
38 Keith E. Whittington, "Once More Unto the Breach: Post-Behavioralist Approaches to Judicial Politics," 
(Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2000).  
39 Jeffrey Allan Segal, The Supreme Court and the attitudinal model, ed. Harold J. Spaeth (Cambridge ;: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993).  
40 Segal, The Supreme Court and the attitudinal model; Thomas G. Hansford, The Politics of Precedent on the 
U.S. Supreme Court, ed. James F. Spriggs (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018); Lee Epstein and 
Jack Knight, The choices justices make, ed. Jack Knight (Washington, D.C: CQ Press, 1998); Cass R. Sunstein 
et al., Are Judges Political? : An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary (Washington DC: Washington 
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006). 
41 Darrell Steffensmeier and Chester L. Britt, "Judges' Race and Judicial Decision Making: Do Black Judges 
Sentence Differently?," Social Science Quarterly 82, no. 4 (2001); Darrell Steffensmeier and Chris Hebert, 
"Women and Men Policymakers: Does the Judge's Gender Affect the Sentencing of Criminal Defendants?," 
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link between judicial outcomes and such demographic features where the subject matter of the case 
does not relate to one of those variables.42 Where the judge’s individual attributes are a key feature of 
the case, however, there is a more visible correlation.43  
However, the extent to which the findings of these scholars can be transferred to Australia is highly 
limited. The attitudinal approach has met with success in the USA due to the highly politicised nature 
of judicial appointments. In many states, local judges campaign for their position, and are voted in by 
their community. Federal and Supreme Court Judges are appointed by the President with an extensive 
congressional vetting process. This means that the party that controls Congress is able to appoint judges 
that will by sympathetic to their legislation. Australian decision-making is more similar to European 
and Commonwealth courts, which exhibit less evidence of ideological influence.44 This is partly due to 
depoliticised judicial appointments, but can also be explained by an increased trust in judicial 
institutions and the perception that criticism of the judiciary could endanger the justice system.45 Despite 
this criticism, the turbulent political environment that surrounds refugee status determination gives a 
strong rationale to test the ideological theories at the AAT.  
1.3.1.2 Institutional Model 
The institutionalist approach acknowledges that decision-makers may have their own ideologies, 
however emphasises the importance of institutional rules, structures and ideas in influencing decision-
outcomes.46 Some institutionalists measure the influence of the ‘internal’ structures of the court, such 
 
Social Forces 77, no. 3 (1999); Malcolm D. Holmes et al., "Judges' Ethnicity and Minority Sentencing: 
Evidence Concerning Hispanics," Social Science Quarterly 74, no. 3 (1993). 
42 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski and Andrew J. Wistrich, "Judging the Judiciary by the Numbers: Empirical Research on 
Judges," Annual Review of Law and Social Science 13, no. 1 (2017). 
43 Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, "Judging the Voting Rights Act," Columbia Law Review 108, no. 1 
(2008); Pat K. Chew and Robert E. Kelley, "Myth of the color-blind judge: an empirical analysis of racial 
harassment cases," Article, Washington University Law Review 86; Jonathan P. Kastellec, "Racial Diversity and 
Judicial Influence on Appellate Courts," American Journal of Political Science 57, no. 1 (2013). 
44 Bleich, "Historical Institutionalism and Judicial Decision-Making," 61-62; Erik Voeten, "The impartiality of 
international judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights," American Political Science Review 
102, no. 4 (2008); Arthur Dyevre, "Unifying the field of comparative judicial politics: towards a general theory 
of judicial behaviour," European Political Science Review 2, no. 2 (2010). 
45 David L Weiden, "Judicial Politicization, Ideology, and Activism at the High Courts of the United States, 
Canada, and Australia," Political Research Quarterly 64, no. 2 (2011). 
46 Epstein and Knight, The choices justices make; Linda Camp Keith, Jennifer S. Holmes, and Banks P. Miller, 
"Explaining the Divergence in Asylum Grant Rates among Immigration Judges: An Attitudinal and Cognitive 
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as the layout of judges on the same bench.47 Others focus on ‘external’ pressures, including the 
possibility of the judgement being overturned,48 public opinion49 and the policy preferences of the 
government in power.50 Historical institutionalists consider the judiciary within their social and 
intellectual context. They assert that ideas such as judicial restraint, procedural justice, independence 
and impartiality have created norms in the Courts and therefore have a role in the preference formation 
of decision-makers.51 Whilst it is possible that institutional factors are causing political influence at the 
AAT, this thesis does not measure them. Rather, its focus is testing the attitudinal theory of decision-
making. 
1.3.1.3 Asylum Decision-Making Literature 
In addition to the general literature on decision-making, there is a small literature on asylum 
decision-making that attempts to theorise what factors are most determinative of asylum outcomes. As 
with the judicial behaviour literature, this scholarship is almost exclusively conducted in the US context. 
Debates within this literature generally sit within the broader “norms versus interests” debate.52 The 
realist school emphasises the role of the diplomatic, security, economic and domestic political 
interests.53 For this school, a determination to grant asylum to the citizen of another state is shaped by 
the receiving state's calculation of the benefits and costs of accepting or rejecting the asylum seekers.54 
 
Approach," Law & Policy 35, no. 4 (2013): 267; Dyevre, "Unifying the field of comparative judicial politics: 
towards a general theory of judicial behaviour," 302. 
47 F; Spriggs Maltzman, J; Wahlbeck, P, "Strategy and judicial choice: new institutionalist approaches to 
Surpreme Court decision-making," in Supreme Court decision-making: new institutionalist approaches, ed. 
Cornell W. Clayton and Howard Gillman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Rachael K. Hinkle, 
"Panel Effects and Opinion Crafting in the US Courts of Appeals," Journal of Law and Courts 5, no. 2 (2017). 
48 Alec Stone Sweet, The judicial construction of Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 25.  
49 Georg Vanberg, "Legislative-judicial relations: a game-theoretic approach to constitutional review," American 
journal of political science 45, no. 2 (2001); Georg Vanberg, The politics of constitutional review in Germany, 
Political economy of institutions and decisions, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
50 William Eskridge, "Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game," 
California Law Review 79, no. 3 (1991); William Eskridge, "Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation 
Decisions," Yale Law Journal 101, no. 2 (1991). 
51 Bleich, "Historical Institutionalism and Judicial Decision-Making," 8.  
52 Keith, Holmes, and Miller, "Explaining the Divergence in Asylum Grant Rates among Immigration Judges: 
An Attitudinal and Cognitive Approach." 
53 Marc R. Rosenblum and Idean Salehyan, "Norms and interests in US asylum enforcement," Journal of Peace 
Research 41, no. 6 (2004): 681. 
54 Gil Loescher and John A Scanlan, Calculated Kindness (Simon and Schuster, 1998); Mark Gibney, Vanessa 
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Alternatively, constructivists assert that normative goals are the primary drivers of asylum decisions.55 
Normative concerns include a humanitarian or altruistic consideration of the asylum applicant and the 
norms of international and refugee law (such as the principle of non-refoulement) that underpin refugee 
status determination.56  As this study is looking at whether political preferences are determinative of 
decision-outcomes, it is primarily testing the realist school of asylum decision-making. A finding of 
politicised decision-making indicates that domestic interests effect asylum decisions (rather than the 
norms of law or humanitarian concerns).  
There have been three large quantitative studies into immigration courts. Two in the US57 and one 
of the Immigration Review Tribunal in Canada.58 They have all found to varying extents that the 
personal preferences of decision-makers affects asylum outcomes. The study of Ramji-Nogales (which 
has a large sample size of 78,459 cases) found that in US Immigration Courts (the equivalent level of 
review to the AAT), the political party appointing the Immigration Judge did not have a statistically 
significant effect on decision outcomes.59 However, her study did find that decision-makers with 
previous immigration work experience with the US government granted rates at significantly lower 
levels than those who had no such prior work experience.60 Rehaag, in his study of judicial leave 
applications (the level of review one step above the administrative tribunal), found Liberal (i.e. 
progressive) appointees decided in favour of the refugees 1.6 times more than Conservative appointees 
(sample size of approximately 23,000 cases).61 Rehaag also found that previous work experience in 
women’s rights granted asylum at a rate 9% higher than other adjudicators.62 Both of these scholars, 
 
55 Keith, Holmes, and Miller, "Explaining the Divergence in Asylum Grant Rates among Immigration Judges: 
An Attitudinal and Cognitive Approach." 
56 Thomas Risse-Kappen et al., The power of human rights: International norms and domestic change, vol. 66 
(Cambridge University Press, 1999); Margaret E Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond borders: 
Advocacy networks in international politics (Cornell University Press, 2014). 
57 Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag, "Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication."; Miller, 
Keith, and Holmes, Immigration Judges and U.S. Asylum Policy. 
58 Rehaag, "Do women refugee judges really make a difference? An empirical analysis of gender and outcomes 
in Canadian refugee determinations."; Rehaag, "Judicial review of refugee determinations: the luck of the 
draw?." 
59 Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag, "Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication," 339. 
60 Ibid, 347. 
61 Rehaag, "Judicial review of refugee determinations: the luck of the draw?," 56. 
62 Rehaag, "Do women refugee judges really make a difference? An empirical analysis of gender and outcomes 
in Canadian refugee determinations," 644-45. 
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however, do not engage with the political science explanations for asylum outcomes. As the studies 
were published in legal journals, their discussion focusses on policy reform.  
Miller’s 2015 quantitative study into asylum decision-making in the US does, however, engage with 
the political science and international relations literature.63 In that study, Miller finds that the ideological 
policy preferences of the decision-maker (measured using biographical data on each judge) strongly 
predict outcomes (sample size of 589,629 cases). Ideologically liberal (i.e. progressive) judges granted 
asylum at a rate 27% higher than conservative judges. In explaining these results, he rejects the ‘interests 
v norms’ binary. Rather, he puts forward a ‘cognitive model’ of asylum decision-making, which 
accounts for differences in how conservative and liberal immigration judges approach different 
information. Using quantitative methods, he finds that the personal policy preferences of the decision-
maker have a larger effect on asylum outcomes when considering extra-legal factors such as material 
and security interests. The attitudes of decision-makers are less important when considering objective 
legal factors such as human rights conditions.64 Whilst the ‘cognitive model’ may offer more detailed 
explanations of decision-making, the design of the Database does not allow it to be thoroughly tested. 
1.3.1.4 Judicial Behaviour studies in Australia 
There is a small but growing body of literature that considers judicial behaviour in Australian courts. 
There has been some quantitative and qualitative focus on the High Court, finding that both ideological 
and institutional factors influence decision making.65 There have also been a handful of studies 
focussing on lower courts66 including some investigations into ideological and institutional influence in 
labour rights cases.67 These studies are useful in that they indicate that some level of ideological 
 
63 Miller, Keith, and Holmes, Immigration Judges and U.S. Asylum Policy. 
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influence is present in Australian courts. They also provide some nuanced insights into political 
interreference that is specific to the Australian context. There have, however, have been no 
investigations that focus on immigration decisions nor any that assess the hybrid institution of the AAT. 
This thesis will address this gap in the literature.  
1.3.2 Public Administration 
Given the mixed role of Members as both judges and government officials, it is appropriate to assess 
the literature on public administration, which theorises how officials interact with the public and make 
decisions. The most relevant theories of public administration are grounded in Lipsky’s theories on how 
public officials exercise their discretion.68 He asserts that ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (officials that 
interact with the public) have individual preferences, however they are constrained by institutional 
limitations, including resource constrains, workload pressures, policies and relations with clients and 
structural influences.69 Lipsky’s theory has developed to recognise four general categories of influence: 
(a) individual decision-maker characteristics, (b) organizational characteristics, (c) client attributes, and 
(d) extra-organizational factors (such as regulations, media, other service agencies).70 It should be noted 
that as in the judicial behaviour literature, these four factors can also be categorised as either 
institutional or individual factors. This similarity between the two bodies of literature allows this thesis 
to synthesise insights from the theories of both schools of thought and apply them to the AAT. 
Public administration theory has had mixed applications to migration tribunals. There has been some 
investigation into refugee determination regimes (rather than individual Tribunals) in Europe and 
Canada. These studies generally use an ethnographic method and provide useful insights into how 
individual and structural factors influence refugee status determination. Dahlvik, for example, conducts 
an astute assessment of the Austrian refugee determination regime. She finds that individual asylum 
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decision-makers are just as important as macro-level structural factors in shaping and ‘constructing’ the 
Austrian migration regime.71  Satzewich, in his assessment of the Canadian regime also emphasised the 
influence of individual and ideological factors in asylum decision outcomes. 72 These studies are useful 
to the present thesis, as they provide a dense account of how structure and agency interrelate in an 
asylum decision-making context. Such discussion is lacking in the judicial behaviour literature, which 
(due to its origins in political science rather than sociology) tends to structure its investigations through 
a rigid quantitative testing of individual theories.  
There have been no such ethnographic investigations into the Australian regime nor into the 
decision-making at the AAT. This may be due to the extremely strict privacy measures enforced by the 
Tribunal and the Home Affairs Department. Whilst these measures protect the identity of asylum 
seekers (who may be persecuted in their country of origin if discovered to have sought asylum in a 
foreign country), the administrative process of refugee-determination is made less transparent. This 
thesis therefore contributes to the public administration literature by expanding its application to the 
Australian regime and attempting to scrutinize the ‘black box’ of refugee tribunals.73 
1.4 HYPOTHESIS 
In light of this theory review and considering the accusations of bias made by politicians and in the 
media, I have come to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Liberal-appointed Members will overturn cases at a lower rate than Labor-appointed 
Members   
This hypothesis has two justifications; one based on decision-making theory, and the other based on 
accusations of bias made in media and politics. 
First, and from a theoretical perspective, the hypothesis is grounded in the attitudinal school of 
judicial behaviour. It assumes that Members carrying right-wing political preferences will make 
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decisions in line with a right-wing ideology, and vice versa. Whilst the parties have maintained 
bipartisan support for many aspects of refugee policy since 2012 (including offshore detention, boat 
turn-backs and a general regime of deterrence), 74 the Labor party advocates for higher intake of 
refugees. The Liberal and National Parties have consistently maintained a refugee intake under the 
UNHCR Humanitarian Programme of between 12,000 and 13,750 since 1996.75 In contrast, the Labor 
Party has maintained support for increasing the refugee intake to at least 27,000 whilst in Opposition.76 
Therefore, whilst acknowledging that there may be little difference in the substantive policy preferences 
of the Liberal and Labor parties, it can be inferred that a Labor-appointed Member with left-wing 
political preferences would be more prepared to grant a refugee visa than a Liberal-appointed Member. 
This reasoning is based in the realist school of asylum decision-making theory, as it posits that the 
domestic policy goals of the appointing Party will override the humanitarian concern for the asylum 
applicant, or the norms of international law. 
The second reason for this hypothesis is the accusations made by prominent Members of the Liberal 
Party that Labor-appointed Members determine decisions politically, and have been overturning asylum 
decisions of the Department too frequently.77 As mentioned above, these accusations have also been 
countered by the Labor Party, who allege that the appointment process at the Tribunal has been 
politicised by the Liberal Party. Members are allegedly  appointed not based on merit, but on political 
links and favours.78 Subsequent investigations in the media have found that over 65 Members at the 
Tribunal have close links with the Liberal Party, either as ex-political staffers, donors, members of the 
Party, ex-Members of Parliament or past Liberal candidates at elections.79 These media reports allege 
that this was done to ensure that the strict asylum processing regime instituted by the Liberal Party is 
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not being undermined or disrupted by left-wing Members at the AAT.80 This study tests the veracity of 
these allegations. 
  
 
80 Ibid. 
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2 Methods 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Testing political influence in the AAT presents significant methodological challenges. The refugee 
tribunal has been compared to a ‘black box’ in the public administration literature.81 The sensitive nature 
of asylum hearings and the private decision-making process makes the institution difficult to penetrate 
as a researcher. The fundamental difficulty, however, is that the exact issue this project is attempting to 
uncover (i.e. political influence) should not be there at all. As explained above, the AAT is required to 
be just, fair and unbiased under statute,82 the common law83 and the rule of law.84 Therefore, any person 
associated with the institution is intent on defending its independence and impartiality.  
In response to this challenge, this thesis takes a quantitative approach, which examines the written 
reasons of AAT decisions to find patterns in decision-making. I create a Refugee Decision Database 
(the Database), which consists of all publicly available asylum decisions between July 2015 and the 
end of 2018, amounting to 2,544 cases. These cases are coded along several variables, including the 
outcome of the decision, the Member making the decision and the political party that appointed that 
Member. This data is used to interrogate the allegations of biased decision-making by assessing how 
Liberal- and Labor-appointed Members differ in their decisions, whilst controlling for other explanatory 
variables. This Chapter will first give an overview of the methods used in the public administration and 
judicial behaviour literature to assess decision-making and then outline how the strategic approach of 
this thesis contributes to that literature. It will then proceed to outline and justify the decisions made in 
designing my quantitative method.  
 
81 Tomkinson, "Who are you afraid of and why? Inside the black box of refugee tribunals." 
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2.2 METHODS OVERVIEW 
2.2.1 Qualitative Methods 
There have been several comprehensive qualitative assessments of migration regimes from the law 
and society literature85 and from the public administration literature.86 These studies use a combination 
of surveys, interviews and observation to theorise decision-making in these institutions. Some 
researchers in this field adopt mixed methods approach. In Hamlin’s comparative study of asylum 
determination regimes in Australia, the USA and Canada, she conducted a content analysis of Federal 
Court, and High Court decisions relating to asylum law. She also triangulated this data with interviews 
with policy elites, refugee advocates and refugee lawyers, and collating descriptive statistics on 
decision-making. 
The qualitative approach has clear advantages for the researcher attempting to obtain a 
comprehensive understanding of the factors that contribute to decision-making. It recognises that 
application of refugee criteria in this space is a complex negotiated and relational practice. An attempt 
to reduce this social interaction to a quantitative analysis of observed data runs the risk of losing the 
nuance and contextual specificity of the analysis.87 However, the qualitative approach and specifically 
the collection of ethnographic data through interviews and surveys has significant limitations, especially 
when attempting to test political influence. Refugee hearings at the AAT are closed to the public to 
protect the anonymity of the applicant and any attempt to obtain interviews from Members or 
government officials would prove futile. As is noted by other researchers, decision-makers do not 
readily talk about their political influences. 88  
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For these reasons, interviews and surveys will not constitute a part of the methodology of this thesis. 
Admittedly, any research project that wishes to measure political influence, especially one that properly 
accounts for institutional influence, would require such qualitative data. Such a task lies outside the 
scope and limitations of this thesis, but would be a necessary step in further study. In order to 
compensate for a lack of qualitative data, I have conducted a comprehensive review of the grey literature 
that exists on the AAT, including on its structure, decision-making procedures, performance and 
budgetary measures and the recently released Callinan Report. These sources are useful in 
contextualising and interpreting the results of this investigation. 
2.2.2 Quantitative Methods 
The judicial behaviour literature primarily relies on the quantitative analysis of judicial decisions. 
This method developed heavily in the US, primarily due to the strength of the quantitative approach to 
political science in US universities. At its most basic level, the quantitative assessment of judicial cases 
involves the collation of written decisions, which are coded along a range of variables. The dataset is 
then statistically analysed (predominantly using descriptive statistics and regression) to assess whether 
there is a relationship between the independent variables and the outcome of the case (the dependent 
variable).  Generally, these studies generate two datasets; the case law data and the decision-maker data, 
which codes the characteristics or ideology of the judge. This mode of analysis has been used in 
assessments of decision-makers’ race, gender and sexuality on the outcomes of cases.89 I will now 
proceed to outline the quantitative method of this thesis, first by considering the case sampling method 
and method of statistical analysis. I then proceed to identify and justify my measurement of the 
independent and control variables. 
 
89 Chew and Kelley, "Myth of the color-blind judge: an empirical analysis of racial harassment cases."; Christina 
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2.3 DATABASE DESIGN 
The approach to collating cases generally falls into two categories. First, there are scholars who 
received their cases from an information request to the relevant authority.90 These studies have large 
data sets, however their data is restricted to the information released by the authority. Second, there are 
scholars that collate cases of a particular type and code them manually.91 Whilst the former approach 
presents a dataset that may be more statistically significant, the latter allows one to code more variables 
by manually coding cases. For example, Chew and Kelly coded the presence of racial slurs in the cases, 
a variable that would not be tracked by government departments.92   
The method of this study generally follows the second approach. The Database was constructed by 
collating all publicly available asylum decisions between July 2015 and the end of 2018. July 2015 was 
chosen as this was the date from which the Refugee Review Tribunal (the RRT) was amalgamated with 
the AAT. Decisions are only presented in a uniform fashion from this date onwards. The decisions are 
available on AustLii, which is a community funded, public database that publishes decisions from all 
Australian jurisdictions. 93  
Once all the URLs of the refugee decisions were collected, a scraping code was written that 
harvested the information from each case site. The code was able to collect data on the following 
variables: case name, Member, case outcome, country of origin (of applicant), place application was 
heard, and the date. Due to variations in the formatting of each website, the scraping code was not 
accurate in every instance. Therefore, each case was also checked individually by hand to ensure the 
data was correct. Additionally, the variables that were not harvested by the scraping code were manually 
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included (Party Appointing, Gender, PAM3 Policy and Freedom House Score). See Appendix 5 for a 
randomly selected sample of cases from the Database. 
2.3.1 Sampling Considerations 
The Database codes all decisions published by the AAT; however the AAT chooses to publish only 
a sample of all decisions made in the MRD. Because of this, the Database is subject to the Publication 
Policy of the AAT. By collating the caseload statistics published in the AAT Annual Reviews,94 it was 
calculated that the Database represents approximately 16% of all asylum decisions made during the 
relevant period. Whilst this is a relatively small percentage, further statistical analysis explained below 
proves that it is sufficiently representative of the universe of decisions.  A comparison of the Database 
sample and the universe of decisions is presented in Table 1.  
Table 1 Comparison of cases in Database to the caseload statistics published by the AAT. Note: Percentages for AAT data 
are the averaged percentage as calculated using the publicly available data from 2015-2018. See Appendix 4 for a full 
explanation and presentation of this data. 
 No. of Cases Non-jurisdictional 
cases (%) 
Cases 
overturned (%)  
Cases affirmed 
(%) 
Database 2,544 10% 16% 73% 
AAT data on refugee 
decisions, 2015-2018 
15,443 
 
20% 11% 70% 
 
As seen in Table 1, Members affirm decisions at similar rates in the Database (73%) as they do in 
the universe (70%). There is, however, a larger proportion of non-jurisdictional cases in the universe 
(20%) compared to the Database (10%). This statistic is difficult to explain but may be clarified by 
recognising the large jump in non-jurisdictional cases in 2017-18 as reported by the AAT. Nonetheless, 
this does not affect the validity or usefulness of the Database, as non-jurisdictional cases are excluded 
anyway, as explained in the next section. 
There is also a 6% higher rate of overturning decisions in the Database. This may be explained by 
the AAT’s policy on cases to be published on AustLii, which publishes a higher proportion of 
 
94 AAT, Annual Report 2015-16,  (Canberra 2016); AAT, Annual Report 2016-17; AAT, Annual Report 2017-
18,  (Canberra 2018). 
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contentious cases such as stateless persons and visa cancellations.95 Such cases have a higher rate of 
being overturned by the Tribunal. Whilst this disparity may mean that the Database is not a perfectly 
accurate reflection of the universe in relation to the number of cases overturned, this does not pose an 
issue for the investigation into Member bias. The representation of Members is still random (i.e. there 
is no preference for publishing cases decided by a Liberal- or Labor-appointed Member.)96  
2.2.3.2 Non-Jurisdictional Cases 
The quantitative analysis excludes all non-jurisdictional cases. These are cases where an application 
has been rejected because it was made out of time, because the applicant failed to submit a document 
or because the applicant failed to appear at the hearing. In coming to these decisions, the Member has 
no discretion in how to proceed, and there is therefore no ‘space’ for political preference to interfere 
with the decision. Therefore, non-jurisdictional cases do not a give any insights into decision-making 
and are therefore excluded from analysis. 
2.2.3.3 Is the sample affected by the ‘Publication Policy’? 
The sample in the Database is also subject to the ‘Publication Policy’ of the AAT, which determines 
what type and how many cases are published annually. Given the significance of this Policy on the 
validity of Database sample to reflect the universe of decisions, copies of the current and previous 
publication policies were obtained from the AAT via a private request.97 The policy was indeterminate 
for the period between July 2015 and 27 November 2017, stating only that the Tribunal is required to 
publish decisions of particular interest.98 From 27 November 2017, the new iteration of the publication 
policy was more transparent. In summary, it detailed the following guidelines for publication: 
1. 25% of decisions from the 25 most common countries of origin (chosen randomly); 
2. 100% of decisions from all other countries of origin (or stateless applicants); 
3. 5% of cases from Malaysia; 
4. 20% of cases from China; 
 
95 AAT, Publication of Decisions Policy,  (Canberra 2019). 
96 Ibid, 3.  
97 See email with Keegan Hughes, Senior Reporting Officer Administrative Appeals Tribunal Principal 
Registry, Melbourne. Received Tuesday, 13 August 2019 9:38 AM. Available on request to author. 
98 Migration Act (Cth) 1958, s431. 
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5. Any other decisions that are of particular interest (for example, cases dealing with novel or 
complex issues).99 
 
Given that the Database codes only published decisions, it will be subject to any biases created by the 
selective decisions policy. For the following reasons, however, any biases created by the decision 
‘Publication Policy’ will not have a significant effect on the data and will not invalidate the usefulness 
of the Database for assessing political influence.  
First, the overwhelming majority of cases in the Database are those published under the first policy 
point mentioned above (i.e. 25% of decisions from the 25 most common countries). Decisions published 
under (1) are completely random and therefore constitute an accurate representation of the universe of 
decisions. Whilst cases published under (2) and (5) may slightly skew the data, these cases represent 
only a minuscule proportion of the Database. Additionally, cases from (2) are excluded from the 
regression analysis.100 Therefore, any irregularities in decision-making patterns that arise in the cases 
published under policy (2) or (5) will not make a sufficient impact on the Database. 
Second, the limitation of Chinese and Malaysian decisions will actually increase the utility of the 
Database for measuring political influence. It has been recognised in the Callinan Report and in the 
media that many applicants from these two countries are exploiting the asylum system to obtain 
bridging visas and extend their stay in Australia.101 Decisions for such applicants are therefore almost 
always affirmed, and therefore Members exercise very little discretion in such decisions. I consider this 
phenomenon further at section 2.4.3.1. 
Third, in order to ensure that the update to the Publication Policy on 27 November 2017 did not 
affect the representation of cases in the Database, I conducted a basic statistical comparison of cases 
published before and after that data. As seen in the cross-tabulation below (Table 2), there is not a 
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significant difference in the overturn rates before and after the new policy was published (!"(1) = .078, 
p = 0.390). This indicates that the publication policy was not changed significantly in November 2017 
but rather was simply made public.  
Table 2 Cross-tabulation of Old and New Publication Policy, and Decision Outcomes. 
 Affirmed Overturned Total 
 Old 
Policy 
Count 1321 277 1598 
% 82.7% 17.3% 100.0% 
New 
Policy 
Count 547 127 674 
% 81.2% 18.8% 100.0% 
Total Count 1868 404 2272 
%  82.2% 17.8% 100.0% 
 
Finally, and most importantly, the purpose of the Database is not to reflect the global statistics on 
decision-making of refugee decisions at the AAT. Those numbers are already published publicly by the 
AAT annually. This Database contributes new empirical data by coding the identity of the Member and 
the political party that appointed that Member. The site of analysis of this thesis is not trends in decision-
making generally, but rather a comparison of how Liberal- and Labor-appointed Members make 
decisions. Therefore, given that the AAT does not publish certain Members’ decisions at a higher 
proportion of other Members, the Database is a valid source for investigating the presence of political 
bias.102  
A possible weakness of the Database would be if the AAT assigns certain types of cases to specific 
Members; for example, certain Members may end up specialising in Middle Eastern cases, which have 
a much higher overturn rate than Asian cases. However, in the comprehensive review of the Database 
and other material published by the AAT, there is no evidence of such a practice occurring. Also, any 
potential effect of selective case assignment would be controlled for in my statistical analysis, as the 
model controls for ‘country of origin’ and the country overturn rate. Therefore, where the major factor 
 
102 AAT, Publication of Decisions Policy. 
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contributing to the decision outcome is actually the country of origin (rather than the political leanings 
of the Member), this is accounted for in the regression analysis. 
2.4 VARIABLES 
This section gives an overview of how the variables are measured in the Database. I first focus on 
the dependent variable (decision outcome) and then the main independent variable (Party Appointing 
the Member), and finally the control variables: gender of the Member, place of decision, country of 
origin of applicant, the global overturn rate of the country of origin, the Freedom House score of the 
country of origin and whether the new PAM3 policy of July 2017 was relevant.  
2.4.1 Dependent Variable - Decision Outcome  
The primary purpose of the AAT is to either ‘affirm’ or ‘overturn’ government decisions. Where a 
decision has been ‘affirmed’ by the Tribunal, this indicates that an asylum applicant was denied a 
refugee visa at first instance by the Department and has now also been denied a visa by the AAT. Where 
a decision has been ‘overturned’ by the Tribunal, the Member has determined that the Department’s 
decision was wrong, and that the application should be allowed. The main statistic that will be reported 
is the ‘overturn rate’, which represents the proportion of cases each group of Members determined were 
wrongly decided by the Department in the first instance. 
2.4.2 Independent variable: Party Appointing 
The independent variable of this investigation is the political ideology of the decision-maker. 
Measuring political attitudes is particularly challenging as the Member is required to be independent, 
unbiased and apolitical.103 Direct questioning of the decision-maker would therefore be futile. The 
researcher must rely on external indicators to infer the political leanings of each decision-maker. The 
school of judicial behaviour has developed several inventive methods for determining the ideological 
inclinations of judges. In the literature, these are classified into ex post and ex ante methods.104 The 
 
103 AAT, Conduct Guide for AAT Members.  
104 Lee Epstein, The behavior of federal judges: a theoretical and empirical study of rational choice, ed. 
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2013). 
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former involves measuring political ideology from past decisions, whilst the latter looks to external 
indicators. 
The Martin-Quinn Score is the most prominent ex post approach. It involves analysing the previous 
votes of US Supreme Court justices and assigning each characterising each decision along a liberal-
conservative spectrum.105 The decisions of the judges are tracked over time, allowing both a measure 
of their political inclination and of how it has changed over time. Despite this, an ex post model is not 
appropriate in this investigation for two reasons. First, its application is generally limited to top-tier 
courts, such as the US Supreme Court, in which both the cases and the judicial-appointment process is 
highly politicised. Whilst political decision-making in courts nonetheless exists outside Australia and 
in lower courts (indeed, this thesis is investigating exactly that), it is not as blatant or obvious. Second, 
the purpose of this thesis is not to measure decision-makers’ political inclinations, but rather to find a 
link between the political appointment of Members and outcomes of cases. Where the ex ante approach 
assumes an inductive approach of observation, this investigation aims to deductively test political 
influence in the AAT. 
An ex ante measure of judicial ideology uses media content analysis to generate an ideological score 
for each decision-maker. The Segal-Cover score, which measures the political ideology of Supreme 
Court nominees, is an example of this approach. It reviews editorials in four newspapers (of both 
conservative and liberal leanings) about a Supreme Court nominee, which are coded on a scale from -­ 
1 (unanimously conservative) to 0 (moderate) to + 1 (unanimously liberal).106 This approach is useful 
in that it does not require the researcher to subjectively determine the political leaning of a judicial 
decision, and relies on public perception. It also allows interesting insights into the relationship between 
the judiciary, the media and public opinion. As with the Martin-Quinn Score, however, it is generally 
 
105 Andrew D. Martin and Kevin M. Quinn, "Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
for the U.S. Supreme Court," Political Analysis 10, no. 2 (2002); Ward Farnsworth, "The use and limits of 
Martin-Quinn scores to assess Supreme Court justices, with special attention to the problem of ideological 
drift.(response to article by Lee Epstein and others in this issue, p. 1483)," Northwestern University Law Review 
101, no. 4 (2007). 
106 See Jeffrey A. Segal and Albert D. Cover, "Ideological values and the votes of U.S. Supreme Court justices. 
," American Political Science Review 83, no. 2 (1989)., updated in Jeffrey A. Segal et al., "Ideological Values 
and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited," The Journal of Politics 57, no. 3 (1995). 
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limited to the US Supreme Court and other similar Courts, as appointments in other Courts do not gain 
nearly as much media attention.  
The most common ex ante measure of judicial ideology, and most successful according to Epstein, 
is the political party of the appointing government.107 This approach is frequently applied in attitudinal 
studies of courts below the Supreme Court level108 and has been applied in immigration decision-
making previously.109 It is useful where there is little biographical information available on the political 
inclination of the decision-maker.  However, the ‘political party appointing’ approach has limitations. 
It is a crude measure of ideology as it relies on the assumption that appointments are politicised. 
(Nonetheless, it can actually be used to test of how politicised the appointment process is.) An additional 
weakness is that it may not be useful when studying specialised courts that deal with technical cases 
that are distanced from ideological influence.110 To account for these failings, scholars have turned to 
the work-experience of the decision-maker. For example, Rehaag found that female immigration judges 
who had previous experience working in women’s rights were more sympathetic to refugee 
claimants.111 Keith et al argue that especially when looking to lower courts that exercise technically 
specific functions, this approach allows a nuanced account of the judge’s policy preferences in a 
particular area.112 This accounts for the fact that judges may have conservative inclinations in some 
areas but liberal predispositions in others.113  
This study initially attempted to find biographical data on all Members. Whilst there was some 
publicly available work-experience information for a handful of Members, the CVs of the 
 
107 Epstein, The behavior of federal judges: a theoretical and empirical study of rational choice. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Rehaag, "Judicial review of refugee determinations: the luck of the draw?." Melissa G. Ocepek and Joel S. 
Fetzer, "The Causes of Pro-Immigration Voting in the United States Supreme Court," The International 
Migration Review 44, no. 3 (2010). 
110 Joseph Jucewicz and Lawrence Baum, "Workload Influences on Supreme Court Case Acceptance Rates, 
1975-1984," The Western Political Quarterly 43, no. 1 (1990); Banks Miller and Brett Curry, "Expertise, 
Experience, and Ideology on Specialized Courts: The Case of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit," Law 
& Society Review 43, no. 4 (2009). 
111 Rehaag, "Do women refugee judges really make a difference? An empirical analysis of gender and outcomes 
in Canadian refugee determinations." 
112 Keith, Holmes, and Miller, "Explaining the Divergence in Asylum Grant Rates among Immigration Judges: 
An Attitudinal and Cognitive Approach." 
113 Joshua B. Fischman and David S. Law, "What is judicial ideology, and how should we measure it?," 
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 29 (2009). 
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overwhelming majority of Members were not publicly available. Additionally, it appears that where 
Members have previously had political work experience (such working in unions or as a political 
staffer), they have attempted to scrub this from the public record. The findings of this sample of 
Members are presented in Appendix 1.  
Accordingly, this study uses the ‘Party Appointing’ approach. This is appropriate because the data 
is readily and publicly available in the AAT Annual Reports. Additionally, it allows the study to test 
the accusations of politicised appointments that provide the rationale for this study.114 
2.4.3 Control Variable: Country of Origin 
The country of origin of the asylum applicant is the most important control variable, as the role of 
the country of origin is highly important under refugee determination law and procedure. The 
fundamental task of an AAT Member is to assess whether the applicant will be safe in their country of 
origin. The importance of the country of origin is evident when assessing the decision-making process 
of the Member. 
First, the Member states the relevant law, which is the test for meeting the criteria to be a refugee, 
as found in ss 5H and 36 of the Migration Act (Cth) 1958. Most decision-makers then lay out the 
applicant’s claims and evidence that supports those claims. This includes the applicant's identity and 
the reasons that he or she is alleged to be persecuted. The final section, entitled “Findings and Reasons” 
consists of first assessing the credibility of the applicant’s submissions, and then considering whether 
they meet the refugee test. This involves looking to evidence from credible sources on the state of affairs 
in the applicant’s country of origin, including government reports (primarily relying on those written 
by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)), and reports written by international 
organisations such as the UN, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. For these reasons, it is 
expected that the political, economic and social situation of the applicant’s country of origin will have 
the most significant effect on the success of an asylum application.   
 
114 Whitbourn, "Federal Labor vows to end political appointments to AAT."; David Hardaker, "The Big Stack; 
How the goernment stacked the AAT."; Gribbin, "Peter Dutton blames 'politics' as bid to deport six refugees 
fails." 
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2.4.3.1 Malaysia 
The significance of Malaysian cases in the Database must be noted. It is overwhelmingly the most 
represented country in the Database (N = 421), with the second highest being China (N = 284).115 
Additionally, at 7%, Malaysia has one of the lowest rates of being overturned. When taking into account 
all cases from Malaysia between 2015 and 2018 (using data provided by the AAT), this figure drops to 
3%.116 When assessing how Liberal- and Labor-appointed Members make decisions, there also appears 
to be only a small variation in overturn rates. This raises the question, why are there so many asylum 
applications from a relatively safe country with low levels of persecution? 
This question was answered in the Callinan Report, in which Callinan, whilst not naming Malaysian 
applicants specifically, noted that there were “many instances in which applicants (including many on 
bridging visas) contrived or deliberately altered their circumstances in Australia for the principal 
purpose of renewing their visas or establishing a new pathway to a different visa.”117 This was labelled 
as an “orchestrated scam” by the Minister for Multicultural Affairs118 and was even acknowledged by 
the Malaysian Government, who stated that Malaysian applicants apply for protection visas on the 
pretext that their lives are in danger, but as is an excuse to stay longer in Australia.119 It therefore appears 
that a significant proportion of Malaysian applications are used as means of obtaining an automatic 
bridging visa pending an outcome of their application.  
The high incidence of inauthentic claims from Malaysia and possibly other countries could pose an 
issue for the Database. The primary purpose of the Database is to measure political influence in 
decision-making. As discussed previously in relation to non-jurisdictional cases, such political 
interference can only exhibit itself where the Member has sufficient space to exercise some discretion. 
In cases such as an inauthentic Malaysian application, where the claim is obviously bound to fail, there 
 
115 It should also be noted that the AAT publishes a lower percentage of Malaysian cases than every other 
country, according to their Publication Policy. AAT, Publication of Decisions Policy, 7. 
116 See data on All AAT Decisions, collated in Appendix 4. 
117 Callinan, Statutory Review of the Tribunals Amalgamation Act 2015, 25-6. 
118 Gothe-Snape and Wijaya, "Malaysia says Australia's immigration system encourages visa rorting." 
119 Gothe-Snape, "Border Force working to stop Malaysians in 'orchestrated scam' to stay in Australia." 
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is limited discretion exercised. Given that Malaysian cases constitute 18.5% of the Database, this is a 
significant number proportion of cases in which it is unlikely that any discretion is being used.  
However, the solution is not to remove Malaysian cases or cases that are extremely likely to fail 
from analysis altogether. Given that 3% of all Malaysian cases at the AAT were overturned between 
2015 and 2018,120 there is clearly still some level of decision-making by the Member. The Malaysian 
cases are distinguished from the non-jurisdictional cases in which the Member has option with how to 
determine the case whatsoever. By removing Malaysian cases, I would be pre-judging applications as 
not genuine. Indeed, it is the very job of the Members to make that exact decision. Removing a selection 
of cases because they may be inauthentic would mean the Database is an inaccurate reflection of 
decision-making. Additionally, to just take out Malaysian cases would be arbitrary, given that 
applicants from other countries could also be exploiting the asylum application system.  
2.4.4 Control Variable: Freedom House Score 
My Database will also code the average Freedom House Score of each country of origin for the 
relevant period. The Freedom House score is a measure published annually by the independent 
‘watchdog organisation’ Freedom House.121 The statistic measures the civil and political status of rights 
in most countries and territories around the globe, giving each state a score out of seven. Whilst its 
method has attracted some criticism in the literature,122 the Freedom House score is generally recognised 
as a useful and accurate measure of freedom and rights globally.  
I code the Freedom house score because it is an additional measure that controls for the impact of 
the applicant’s country of origin on case outcomes. This is because an applicant from a country that has 
a lower freedom house score will be more likely to obtain refugee status (however, this is not always 
the case). The Freedom House score is also useful as it gives an insight into how international politics 
 
120 This figure refers to the total number of cases as published by the AAT, not the sample in the Database. 7% 
of Malaysian cases in the Database were overturned. See Appendix 4 for full collation of public AAT Data. 
121 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2019, Freedom House (2019). 
122 Diego Giannone, "Political and ideological aspects in the measurement of democracy: the Freedom House 
case," Democratization 17, no. 1 (2010). Gerardo L. Munck and Jay Verkuilen, "Conceptualizing and measuring 
democracy: Evaluating alternative indices," Comparative political studies 35, no. 1 (2002). John Högström, 
"Does the choice of democracy measure matter? Comparisons between the two leading democracy indices, 
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may affect decision making. It is expected that that applicants from countries have a low freedom rating, 
but are also allies or trading partners of Australia may be less likely to receive asylum. This could be 
because the Government does not want to offend that country by indirectly acknowledging that it is 
unsafe by granting humanitarian visas. Alternatively, such influence could be subconscious; countries 
that are our allies or partners are generally assumed to be safe. This phenomenon has been touched on 
by Miller, in his comprehensive study of US immigration decision-making, however, it has not been 
tested in Australia.123  
I calculate the Average Freedom House score for each country for the period of analysis (2015-
2018). Further details on the method for generating the Freedom House statistic and the results for each 
country are reported in Appendix 3. The score is measured as a continuous variable. For this reason, its 
relationship with decision-outcomes is measured solely using the regression analysis (rather than using 
cross-tabulation, which is used for the other categorical explanatory variables).  
2.4.5 Control Variable: Gender  
 The school of judicial behavioural studies has focussed extensively in the US on testing whether 
the personal attributes of judges (such as gender, race or religion) have a correlative effect on judicial 
outcomes. The findings on the effect of gender have been mixed. The two major studies on refugee 
decision-making have found that female judges make decisions differently to male judges. Ramji-
Nogales’ study of US immigration courts found that applicants who had their case heard before a female 
applicant were therefore 44.2% more likely to succeed.124 However, Rehaag’s investigation into 
Canadian refugee tribunals found no significant difference between the grant rates for male and female 
judges. He did find, however, that female adjudicators had higher grant rates where they had prior 
experience in women's rights, in cases involving female claimants, and in cases involving gender-based 
persecution. 
 
123 Miller, Keith, and Holmes, Immigration Judges and U.S. Asylum Policy. 
124 Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag, "Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication."  
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 The effect of gender on decision-outcomes in asylum applications therefore appears to be 
unsettled in the literature. Undoubtedly, it should not have any impact on decision-outcomes. It would 
be a degradation of rule of law and the principles of justice that guide decision-making at the AAT if 
gender (or any other demographic feature of the Member) had an impact on decision-outcomes. For 
these reasons, this study will code the gender of the Member, to assess whether female decision-makers 
decide differently to their male counterparts. It is not expected that gender will have a significant impact 
on decision-outcomes, in line with the findings of Rehaag. 
2.4.6 Control Variable: Place of decision 
The place that the case was decided will be coded and analysed as a variable. The rationale for this 
is twofold. First, it is fundamental to the rule of law in Australia that the law is equally applied in all 
areas of its jurisdiction. An applicant in Sydney should receive the same outcome to their case if it were 
heard in Melbourne, Adelaide or Perth.125 The second reason is that both US and Canadian studies found 
drastic variability of asylum decision making in courts around the country. 126 The authors do note that 
these disparities may be due to the clustering of certain types of applications in different cities. 
Nonetheless, place of decision is coded and controlled for in this study.  
Given that the majority of decisions are heard in Sydney and Melbourne, it is expected that these 
cities will have similar overturn rates. However, in Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth (the only other cities 
where the Refugee Division sits), where the sample size is smaller, it is expected that the variability in 
decision rates will be higher.  
2.4.7 Control Variable: Policy – PAM3  
The Procedures Advice Manual 3 (PAM3) is a Policy Direction given under section 499 of the 
Migration Act (Cth) 1958, which allows the Minister to give guidance to persons administering the 
Migration Act. The primary purpose of the PAM3 Policy is to inform decision-makers in the 
Department of Home Affairs on how they should interpret and apply the Act in relation to asylum 
 
125 See further, Bingham, "The rule of law." 
126 Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag, "Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication," 329; 
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decisions. It may, for example, direct a decision maker to give particular weight to some considerations 
and less to others, or express a preference for taking a certain course of action in situations where more 
than one option is available. The public interest justification for such Directions is that they clear up 
ambiguities in the legislation. This has benefits for the rule of law: it makes decisions more uniform 
and ensures that there is consistency in the application of the law. Members at the AAT are required to 
remake the decision of the Department using the same information and documents available to the 
original decision-make, including the PAM3 policy.  
The PAM3 policy was updated on 1 July 2017 to include updates to the law and changes in how 
delegates of the Minister should be assessing claims. The Policy update includes new directions that 
made it more difficult for certain asylum claims to be successful. The new PAM3 Policy introduced 
new sections on the following matters: 
(a) how serious non-political crimes are to be assessed under s5H(2)(b) of the Act; 
(b) how a negative security assessment by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation is to 
be dealt with under s36(1B) of the Act; 
(c) includes more detailed guidance on how to assess whether an applicant is a danger to the 
Australian community under s36(1C)(b) of the Act; 
(d) more detailed advice on how to apply the subjective element of the well-founded fear test. 
 
The increased focus on criminal assessments, security concerns and the applicant’s danger to the 
Australian public is symptomatic of the trend towards the securitisation and criminalisation of seeking 
asylum.127 Given the recognised difficulties of measuring the impact of migration policy globally,128 
this study presents a prime opportunity to quantitatively test how political debate filters into the 
migration regime (outside of definitive legislative change). Therefore, in order to test the effect of this 
change in Policy, this study will code whether each case was decided under the new or old PAM3 
policy, to determine whether the change in policy has had an effect on the outcomes of cases.  
Including the new PAM3 variable also tests whether Policy Directions can be used by the Minister 
to surreptitiously exert political influence on the Tribunal. In an extensive review of migration decisions 
 
127 See discussion below at section 4.2.3. 
128  Michel Beine et al., "Comparing immigration policies: An overview from the IMPALA database," 
International Migration Review 50, no. 4 (2016); Justin Gest et al., "Measuring and comparing immigration, 
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at the Tribunal, Ng finds that ministerial directions “reduce the decisional independence of both the 
immigration tribunals and the AAT, as the directions in effect make the tribunals behave more like 
internal reviewers as they do not question the lawfulness of the government policy.”129 Therefore, if the 
change in policy does have a statistically significant impact on how decisions are determined, it would 
indicate that the Direction is a significant tool for exerting structural political influence on the Tribunal 
(rather than behavioural or ideological, as is tested using the other variables). For these reasons, it is 
expected that there will be a lower overall grant rate after the introduction of the new PAM3 Policy for 
both Labor- and Liberal-appointed Members. 
2.5 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
The key empirical contribution of this thesis will be the statistical analysis of the Database. In her 
study of US asylum decision-making, Ramji-Nogales reported asylum grant rates mainly through the 
standard deviation of each asylum office or judge from the mean.130 This was used to show how erratic 
and unreliable asylum decision-making is in the USA. Ramji-Nogales’ study was published in the 
Stanford Law Review, and therefore the majority of the discussion centred around the implications of 
the variability in decision-making on the rule of law.  
My study, however, will not refer as readily to the mean as I focus on finding a correlation between 
the political preferences of a Member and decision-outcomes. Therefore, this thesis will primarily focus 
on cross-tabulation as a means of presenting and analysing the data. Contingency tables allow one to 
compare how two different groups (Liberal- and Labor-appointed Members) perform the same task. 
Double layered contingency tables also allow one to compare how the Members make decisions within 
different variables. For example, the next chapter includes sections on how Liberal- and Labor-
appointed Members make decisions for applicants from specific regions and countries. 
I also report the chi-squared value, which measures the association between two variables by 
comparing the expected values of a contingency table to the actual values. Where there is a significant 
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departure from the expected values, it indicates that there may be a relationship.131 Therefore, a chi-
squared (2) value of 0 indicates that the variables are independent, and an association can be inferred 
where 2 is larger than the chi-squared critical value. The critical value is dependent on the size of the 
contingency table (the degrees of freedom) and the level of statistical significance chosen. “Statistical 
significance” is expressed using the p value (often p≤.05 or more stringently, p≤.01). This expression 
means that the result occurs less than or equal to five times (or one time) out of a hundred. When a 
result occurs this seldom, statisticians assume it did not occur by chance.132 The chi-squared test the 
most appropriate test of statistical independence, as it is able to deal with categorical variables. 
2.6 REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Regression analysis measures the strength and direction of a correlation between two variables, 
whilst controlling for one or several other variables that my affect an outcome. The majority of judicial 
behaviour scholars use logistic regression rather than standard linear regression.133 In brief, logistic 
regression models a dependent variable using a logistic function, rather than a linear predictor function. 
It is used where there is a binary dependent variable (e.g. in this case, the decision outcome is either 
overturned or affirmed). Whilst the output of a logistic regression (a log-odds unit, or logit) is more 
difficult to interpret, it is generally accepted in the judicial behaviour the most appropriate statistical 
model for this type of analysis.134 In order to overcome the difficulty of understanding the logit value 
(β), results for the regression analysis are reported as odds ratios (Expβ). Therefore, the results will 
state ‘the odds of a decision being overturned increase by # times when the case is determined by a 
Labor-appointed Member, as opposed to a Liberal-appointed Member.’ 
However, there is debate amongst scholars as to the most appropriate causative measure. Several 
judicial behaviour scholars criticise the use of regression analysis for implying a causal link, where one 
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does not, in fact, exist.135 These scholars attempt to apply other methods of statistical analysis to 
establish causation, such as matching analysis,136 competing risk analysis137 and Greiner’s 
comprehensive ‘potential outcomes’ framework.138  Whilst there may be virtue in pursuing alternate 
methods of proving causation, this debate is beyond the scope of the proposed project. As logistic 
regression is simple to apply, ubiquitous within the literature, and can deal with multiple variables, it 
will be used in this project.  
2.6.1 Sample Size Problem 
A significant problem arises when running regression and controlling for the country of origin. 
Whilst the most common countries have sample sizes large enough to recognise legitimate trends, there 
is a large proportion of countries where applications appear in the Database less than 10 times. Such a 
small sample size poses a problem for the regression analysis, as it would fill the model with a large 
number of dummy variables that are not statistically significant. Additionally, measuring the country 
of origin as a categorical variable creates a large number of dummy variables (91 dummy variables in 
the case of this Database). Logistic regression does not function well where there are too many classes 
in a categorical variable, especially where several have low sample sizes.139 This problem is noted in 
the literature of quantitative refugee analysis. The two quantitative studies on asylum decision-making 
in the USA140 and Canada141 (from which this study draws heavily), have taken different approaches to 
solving this problem.  
Rehaag, in his studies of refugee tribunals and Courts in Canada, controls for the impact of the 
applicant’s country by including the “yearly average grant rates by country of origin as a continuous 
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independent variable”.142 Each country is coded with a value of 0 to 1, determined by the percentage of 
cases from that country that are successfully overturned per year. Calculating the yearly average grant 
rate is useful as it simplifies the logistic regression model. Rather than using over 180 dummy variables 
representing separate countries (many of which have very small sample sizes), it uses a single 
continuous independent variable. However, this approach creates a cyclical measurement that loses 
variability in the data and risks an overfitted model. The independent variable - average grant rates for 
countries of origin - is calculated based on a portion of the dependent variable outcomes - decision 
outcomes.  
Ramji-Nogales, in her study of US Immigration Judges, limited her statistical analysis to “Asylee 
Producing Countries (APCs)”: countries which appeared at least 500 times in the database, and that 
had a national grant-rate of 30%. 143 This limited her analysis to 15 core APCs. Whilst this approach is 
beneficial for the statistical rigidity of their study, its observations are only applicable to a small number 
of countries. 
In conducting this study, I took the approach of Ramji-Nogales, and limit my regression model to 
countries that have a sample size of N > 30. This takes only the top 15 countries, and generates a dataset 
is 1923 cases, constituting 85% of decisions in the Database. This allows me to assess the overwhelming 
majority of the Database, without having the results of the logistic regression skewed by countries with 
a small sample size.  It also avoids any risk of the model overfitting the data, as is possible under 
Rehaag’s approach. A minimum of 30 cases was chosen as it ensures that the logistic regression analysis 
is accurate. Statistical scholars dispute the minimum sample size required for logistic regression. Some 
abide by a rule of 10 per variable,144 or even less,145 whilst others advocate for higher sample sizes 
 
142 Rehaag, "Do women refugee judges really make a difference? An empirical analysis of gender and outcomes 
in Canadian refugee determinations." 
143 Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag, "Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication," 18. 
144 Maarten van Smeden et al., "Sample size for binary logistic prediction models: beyond events per variable 
criteria," Statistical methods in medical research 28, no. 8 (2019). 
145 Eric Vittinghoff and Charles E. McCulloch, "Relaxing the Rule of Ten Events per Variable in Logistic and 
Cox Regression," American Journal of Epidemiology 165, no. 6 (2006). 
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around 50.146 It is acknowledged, however, that any conclusions on political bias made from this 
regression analysis can only be attributed to the top 15 countries of the Database. 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
The method of this investigation is a significant contribution to the political science literature. Given 
the lack of quantitative studies of judicial behaviour of Australian courts and tribunals, progress made 
in method design are vitally important in order to grow the body of literature in Australia. It is hoped 
that the careful methodological decisions made in this thesis, which have been informed by the 
comprehensive methods in the US and Canada, lay the groundwork for future quantitative studies in 
Australia. 
  
 
146 Bujang et al., "Sample Size Guidelines for Logistic Regression from Observational Studies with Large 
Population." 
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3 Results 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having outlined and justified the method of quantitative analysis that lies at the heart of this thesis, 
this chapter will present and analyse the Database. This chapter proceeds as follows: first, I explore the 
relationships between the independent variable (Party Appointing) and the dependent variable 
(decision-outcomes) using cross-tabulation and descriptive statistics. I then turn to the control variables 
(gender, place, country of origin, effect of PAM3 Policy). Finally, I report the results of the logistic 
regression analysis, which measures the effect of each variable whilst controlling for the others. In 
summary it is found that the Party Appointing the Member has a statistically significant effect on 
decision outcomes. The odds of a decision being overturned increase by 1.46 times when the case is 
determined by a Labor-appointed Member, as opposed to a Liberal-appointed Member. 
It is important to note that the primary purpose of this thesis is to assess whether the personal 
attitudes of the Member affects decision-making for asylum applications at the AAT. Therefore, whilst 
there may be interesting conclusions to be drawn from this database in relation to other factors (such as 
patterns in the numbers and types of cases over time), this chapter will not thoroughly explore these 
questions. Rather, data presentation and analysis will focus on investigating relationships between the 
Member and decision outcomes.  
3.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: PARTY APPOINTING 
Before testing the relationship between the Party Appointing the Member and decision outcomes, I 
will give a brief overview of the Members featuring in the Database. Of the 115 different Members that 
appear in the Database, 71 (61.7%) were appointed by a Liberal government and 44 (38.3%) were 
appointed by a Labor government. This ratio was generally reflected in the number of decisions made 
by each group. As seen in Table 3, Liberal-appointed Members accounted for 1393 (61%) of all relevant 
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decisions, and Labor-appointed Members accounted for 879 (38.6%).147 This disparity is expected, as 
the relevant period (July 2015 – 2018) wholly consisted of a Liberal government, leading to a decline 
in the number of Labor appointees.  
Table 3 Cross-tabulation of Members, showing rates of decisions affirmed and overturned by Liberal- ad Labor-appointed 
Members 
 Affirmed Overturned Total 
Party 
Appointing 
Liberal Count 1185 208 1393 
% 85.1% 14.9% 100.0% 
 % of Database 52.2% 9.2% 61.3% 
Labor Count 683 196 879 
%  77.7% 22.3% 100.0% 
  % of Database 30.0% 8.6% 38.7% 
Total Count 1868 404 2272 
%  82.2% 17.8% 100.0% 
 
The key measure in the contingency table above (Table 3) is the rate of overturned decisions for 
Liberal- and Labor-appointed members (in bold). As noted above at section 2.4.1, the overturn rate is 
the proportion of decisions that each group of Members determined were wrongly decided by the 
Department in the first instance. Whilst the overturn rate for the whole database is 17.8%, Liberal-
appointed Members overturned 14.9% of decisions, whereas Labor-appointed Members overturned 
22.3% of decisions. This disparity is an important finding. It indicates that Labor-appointed Members 
overturned decisions at a rate 1.5 times higher than Liberal-appointed Members. This disparity can also 
be expressed assessing the proportion of ‘Overturned’ cases each set of Members are responsible for: 
Decisions by Labor-appointed Members account for 38.6% of all decisions in the Database, but account 
for 48.5% of cases in which the decision was overturned.  
 
147 All further statistics mentioned in this chapter assume that non-jurisdictional cases have been removed from 
the data. Therefore, Liberal-appointed Members accounted for 1393 out of 2272 cases (rather than the entire 
database, which is 2,544 cases). 
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A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relationship between decision 
outcomes and the party appointing the Member. The relation between these variables was significant: !"(1) = 20.003, p < 0.001. The null hypothesis (H0) that decision outcome is independent of the party 
appointing the Member can therefore be rejected. This implies that the hypothesis that the party 
appointing the Member has an effect on the outcome of a case is correct. It also strongly indicates that 
the hypothesis that a Liberal-appointed member is more likely to deny a refugee visa than a Labor-
appointed Member is correct. However, before any such conclusions can be made, the control variables 
and regression model must be considered.  
3.3 COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 
Of the variables measured, the country of origin of the applicant played the most significant role in 
determining the outcome of the asylum application. However, due to the large number of categories in 
the variable (91 countries) and the variation in sample sizes, a chi-squared test was inappropriate. The 
chi-square test of independence is particularly sensitive where the sample size is small and the expected 
cell value in the contingency table falls below 5.148 This occurs for 131 cells (71%) in the contingency 
table comparing ‘country’ and decision outcome. For this reason (as further explained in section 2.6.1), 
I measured the results for only the top 15 countries in the Database using logistic regression.149 These 
results are reported below at 3.7. In summary, however, the results show an extremely strong 
relationship between the applicant’s country of origin and the outcome of their case. 
When measuring the country as a categorical variable, two main observations should be noted. First, 
there is large variation in the number of cases in the Databased from different countries. Some countries 
have very significant sample sizes (Malaysia, N = 421; China, N = 284; India, N = 168). Countries that 
are further from Australia, such as those in Africa and South America, have much lower representation 
in the Database (Zimbabwe, N = 14; Congo, N = 3, Venezuela, N = 2). This distribution reflects the 
distribution recorded in the data published by the AAT annually on all refugee cases.150  The second 
 
148 Mary L. McHugh, "The chi-square test of independence," Biochemia medica 23, no. 2 (2013). 
149 See Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag, "Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication." 
150 Compare to data on all AAT Refugee decisions. Collated data found in Appendix 4. 
51 
 
noteworthy observation is the large disparity between the overturn rates of different countries. Of the 
countries with a sample size larger than N = 30, Afghanistan has the highest overturn rate (71%) whilst 
South Korea (the Republic of Korea) and Taiwan had a 0% overturn rate. It is important to note that the 
overturn rates for countries that have a small sample size may not be useful for extracting general rules, 
but rather are the result of the highly particularised situation of those applicants. For example, the sole 
decision in the Database for an applicant from Kyrgyzstan was successful, thus giving Kyrgyzstan a 
100% overturn rate. However, the facts of this case are unique and involve a complex claim based on 
Christian, female and LGBT-based persecution.151  
3.3.1 Disparity in intra-country overturn rates 
An accurate means of analysing the effect of political ideology on case outcomes is to look at how 
Members determine cases of a similar nature from the same country. There are significant disparities 
between the overturn rates of Liberal- and Labor-appointed Members for some countries, however not 
for others. As shown in Table 4 (which only includes countries where N > 30), some countries (China, 
Malaysia, Nepal, Indonesia, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Taiwan) had very low disparity between how Liberal- and 
Labor-appointed Members determined cases. Other countries (Afghanistan, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, 
Vietnam) had significantly higher disparity between the overturn rates of the two groups of Members 
(difference > 10%).  
The low disparity of overturn rates for countries such as China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Taiwan 
could be explained by the importance of these countries as trading partners for Australia. Middle Eastern 
countries with highly politicised wars or that are corrupt or oppressive regimes, tend to have a higher 
disparity of overturn rates between Liberal- and Labor-appointed Members (for example, Iran, 
Lebanon, Vietnam and Afghanistan). This finding is discussed further in the proceeding sections.  
 
  
 
151 1509351 (Refugee) [2017] AATA 2088 (24 August 2017). 
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Table 4 Overturn rates for countries with a sample size of N > 30. Last two columns show the difference in overturn rate 
and which set of Members had the higher overturn rate. 
Country Liberal 
Overturn Rate 
(%) 
Labor Overturn 
Rate (%) 
Party with higher 
Overturn Rate 
Difference (%) 
Afghanistan 61.50 73.30 Labor 11.80  
Bangladesh 17.90 23.30 Labor 5.40  
China 6.60 4.50 Liberal 2.10 
Egypt 33.30 41.70 Labor 8.40  
Fiji 3.60 3.10 Liberal 0.50 
India 5.10 10.00 Labor 4.90 
Indonesia 8.30 5.30 Liberal 3.00 
Iran 50.00 15.80 Liberal 34.20 
Iraq 63.20 57.70 Liberal 5.50 
Lebanon 22.50 6.90 Liberal 15.60 
Malaysia 4.90 11.90 Labor 7.00 
Nepal 0.00 2.30 Labor 2.30  
Pakistan 23.50 52.20 Labor 28.70 
Sri Lanka 14.90 18.20 Labor 3.30 
Taiwan 0.00 0.00 Equal 0.00 
Vietnam 20.00 38.20 Labor 18.20 
 
Interestingly, the explanation that countries that have experienced war, violence or a breakdown in 
governance would have higher disparities (as Members would have more opportunity to exercise their 
discretion), does not appear to be true. Rather, it appears that the biggest disparity in overturn rates 
occurs for countries that have oppressive governments, rather than violence or civil war. For example, 
Iran, Pakistan and Vietnam have the highest variability of overturn rates. These countries may have 
pockets of unrest, however the primary threat to citizens would be from oppressive government activity 
rather than violent militias. The disparity in overturn rates may be because it is in these countries that 
the decision-maker has the greatest discretion. They are not completely safe, such that applications will 
almost always be refused, yet they are also not completely war-torn failed states, and therefore asylum 
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applications will not always succeed. The threat of persecution in these countries can therefore vary 
significantly depending on the situation of the applicant.  
The also data does not evidence an impact of rising anti-Muslim sentiment in Australian politics,152 
and the lack of support for multiculturalism from within the Liberal Party153 on decision-outcomes. It 
is possible that Liberal-appointed Members with conservative opinions judge Muslim applicants 
differently to Labor-appointed Members. However, as the overturn rate for some Muslim countries is 
higher for Liberal-appointed Members, this hypothesis does not explain the data. 
Nonetheless, the low statistical power of the intra-country comparison rates (due to the small sample 
size) makes it difficult to draw any certain conclusions on how Members make decisions. The finding 
is, therefore, limited to proving that there is a significant disparity in decision outcomes between how 
Labor- and Liberal-appointed Members make decisions. The Database does not clearly illuminate 
clearly as to why these disparities may be occurring. However, the results guide future investigations 
towards a more statistically powerful analysis of country-specific overturn rates, especially in countries 
where the scope for exercising discretion is wider.  
3.3.2 Regional Analysis 
Conducting a layered cross-tabulation allows one to assess how Liberal- and Labor- appointed 
Members treat applications from different regions. Due to the spread the data, only the Middle East and 
Asia154 are given specific attention. Additionally, due to the low sample sizes of some countries, analysis 
is restricted to countries where N > 30.  This sample of Middle Eastern and Asian countries represents 
collectively 79% of the Database. 
 
152 Randa Abdel-Fattah, Islamophobia and Everyday Multiculturalism in Australia (Routledge, 2017); Scott 
Poynting and Victoria Mason, "The new integrationism, the state and Islamophobia: retreat from 
multiculturalism in Australia," International journal of law, crime and justice 36, no. 4 (2008). 
153 Anthony Moran, "Enduring in Practice if Not in Name?—Official Multiculturalism During and Beyond the 
Howard Government," in The Public Life of Australian Multiculturalism: Building a Diverse Nation (Cham: 
Springer International Publishing, 2017); Elsa Koleth, "Multiculturalism: a review of Australian policy 
statements and recent debates in Australia and overseas,"  (2010). 
154 For the purpose of this analysis, the Middle East includes countries from Egypt to Afghanistan. Asia includes 
countries from Pakistan to the eastern border of Asia.  
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3.3.2.1 Middle East 
Figure 2 depicts a breakdown of overturn rates for a sample of countries from the Middle East (see 
Table B, Appendix 2 for a tabulation of this data). When considering the Middle East region as a whole, 
Liberal- and Labor-appointed members overturned cases at similar rates of 40% and 46.8% 
respectively. Within the Middle East, there appears to be a sectarian pattern in how Members determine 
applications. Sunni majority countries (Egypt and Afghanistan) had higher overturn rates by Labor-
appointed Members. Iran, Iraq and Lebanon all have majority Shi’ite population (or at least a significant 
Shi’ite population), and had higher overturn rates by Liberal-appointed Members. These results are 
difficult to explain, as there is no discernible pattern that aligns with the policy preferences of either a 
Liberal- or Labor-aligned ideology. Indeed, given the economic and political isolation of Iran, it might 
have been expected that those with a right-wing ideology would be less likely to grant visas to Iranian 
nationals.  
A possible explanation may be borrowed from US asylum trends in the 1970s, which were driven 
by foreign policy trends rather than human rights concerns. For example, Cuban asylum seekers were 
granted asylum by default in the US as they were characterised as victims of communist persecution.155 
This is contrasted to Haitian refugees, who were assumed to not have valid refugee claims, as Haiti was 
an ally of the US and was anti-communist.156 It is therefore possible that asylum seekers from states that 
are politically or ideologically opposed to Australia (such as the Iranian Shi’ite influenced bloc) would 
be more likely to be granted asylum. However, these explanations likely do not apply to the data in the 
current study, as there is generally bipartisan support for international relations and national security 
issues in Australia. Both parties tend to align with US and NATO positions on international relations.  
  
 
155 Loescher and Scanlan, Calculated Kindness, 79. 
156 Ibid. 
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Figure 2 Graph showing overturn rates for Middle Eastern Countries for Liberal- and Labor-appointed Members. Data labels 
depict the number of cases. Table B, Appendix 2 is a tabulation of this graph. 
 
It is most likely that there is no pattern in Middle Eastern asylum decision-making that can be 
explained ideologically using this data. This may simply be because decisions are not being decided 
along ideological lines or because the sample size for each country is too small to generate meaningful 
data. It may also be due to ‘country of origin’ being a variable that is inadequate at explaining the trends 
in asylum decisions due to the complex variations in the types of asylum claims that can emerge from 
the same country and region. Especially in the Middle East, where there is a plethora of different 
minority groups with drastic variations in levels of persecution and risk (For example, a Yazidi in Iraq 
would have a differing claim to a Sunni or a homosexual also from Iraq, due to the different nature, 
prevalence and extent of their persecution.) Measuring country of origin as a variable hides these intra-
country differences. To properly assess whether Liberal- and Labor- appointed Members treat similar 
cases differently, the cases would also have to be coded according to the specific basis of their claim, 
their religion and the status of their country’s relationship with Australia. Such analysis is outside the 
scope of this thesis. 
56 
 
3.3.2.2 Asia 
Elsewhere in Asia, there were significantly lower rates of overturning decisions; 12.1% of Asian 
decisions were overturned (see Figure 3 and Table C Appendix 2), whereas 43.6% of Middle Eastern 
decisions were overturned. This inter-regional disparity in overturn rates is explained by the different 
levels and types of persecution in each region. Such analysis is, however, outside the scope of this 
thesis, which rather focusses on the disparities between Liberal- and Labor-appointed Members.  
When looking at the breakdown between Members, the overturn rate was higher for Labor-appointed 
Members, who overturned 15.8% of Asian cases. Liberal-appointed Members overturned 9.4%. As 
shown in Figure 3 (and Table 4),157 there is a remarkably equal approach to decision-making amongst 
Liberal- and Labor-appointed Members for most Asian countries. The overturn rates for China, Taiwan, 
India, Bangladesh and Nepal were all within less than 3 percentage points of another. However, Labor-
appointed Members overturned a significantly higher proportion of cases from Pakistan (28.7% higher) 
and Vietnam and (18.2% higher).  
 The Average Freedom House Score also does not appear to explain the disparities in overturn rates 
for Asian countries.  As seen in Table 5, several countries with a high Freedom house Score158 have low 
disparities between overturn rates, including China, Sri Lanka and Malaysia. This generally disproves 
the explanation that countries with high levels of persecution will have a higher disparity in overturn 
rates, as there is more space for the Member’s discretion to work. Ultimately, as with the Middle Eastern 
regional analysis, the conclusions of this study cannot be explanatory as the Database does not code 
particular information on the features of the application and the motivations for the Members’ decision. 
The finding that there is a significant disparity in how Labor- and Liberal-appointed Members 
determine cases from Pakistan and Vietnam (but not other Asian countries) warrants further research.  
  
 
157 See Table C, Appendix 2 for a tabulation of this graph. 
158 A high Freedom House Score connotes low prevalence of civil and political freedoms in that country. 
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Table 5 Average Freedom House Score for Asian Countries, N > 30. See Appendix 3 for further information on Freedom 
House data and calculation method.  
Country Average Freedom House Score 
Bangladesh 4 
China 6.5 
India 2.5 
Indonesia 3 
Malaysia 4 
Nepal 3.5 
Pakistan 4.5 
Sri Lanka 4 
Vietnam 6 
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3.4 GENDER 
The Database showed a remarkably equal representation of decisions made by male and female 
Members. In total, 1146 (50.4%) cases were handed down by females and 1126 (49.6%) cases handed 
down by males. Each gender also had almost equivalent rates of affirming and overturning decisions. 
As seen in Table 6, female Members overturned 17.5% of decisions and male Members overturned 18% 
of decisions. There appears to be no relationship between the gender of the Member and decision 
outcomes. This is supported by the chi-squared test, which found that the two variables were 
independent (!"(1) = 0.093, p = 0.760) 
This finding is also significant as it is the first quantitative finding on the relationship between the 
decision-makers’ gender on the outcome of a case in any Tribunal or Court in Australia. The result 
aligns with previous investigations in refugee decision-making in Canada159 and in public administrative 
generally, which has found that gender has little impact on decision-making for front-line bureaucrats.160 
This finding is, however, out of step with findings in the US,161 where higher overturn rates by female 
Immigration Judges have been explained by theories on female decision-making, which state that 
female decision-makers use a type of moral reasoning that adopts an ‘ethic of care’, and therefore may 
me more sensitive to human need and suffering.162 The evidence from this Database, however, indicates 
that such theories do not apply to asylum decision-making at the AAT. 
  
 
159 Rehaag, "Do women refugee judges really make a difference? An empirical analysis of gender and outcomes 
in Canadian refugee determinations." 
160  Jessica E. Sowa and Sally Coleman Selden, "Administrative discretion and active representation: An 
expansion of the theory of representative bureaucracy," Public Administration Review 63, no. 6 (2003). 
161 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, "Asylum in a Different Voice: Judging Immigration Claims and Gender,"  (2009).  
162 Ibid. 
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Table 6 Cross-tabulation of decision-outcomes and gender. 
 Affirmed Overturned Total 
Female Count 945 201 1146 
% within Gender 82.5% 17.5% 100.0% 
 % within Decision Outcome 50.6% 49.8% 50.4% 
Male Count 923 203 1126 
% within Gender 82.0% 18.0% 100.0% 
 % within Decision Outcome 49.4% 50.2% 49.6% 
Total Count 1868 404 2272 
% within Gender 82.2% 17.8% 100.0% 
 
3.5 PLACE OF DECISION 
Ideally, (or normatively, to ensure fair decision-making) the place of a decision should not have any 
impact on the outcome of the decision. The rule of law requires that the law be applied consistently 
across jurisdictions.163 The Database, however, appears to demonstrate significant differences in the 
overturn rates for each city. A chi-squared test found that the place of decisions and the decision 
outcome were not independent variables: !"(4) = 45.438, p < 0.001. Sydney had the lowest rate of 
overturning decisions at 13.5%, whilst the national average was 17.8% (See Table 7). This is contrasted 
to Adelaide, which had an overturning rate of 35.2%. However, one should be cautious in extrapolating 
any conclusions from the variation in this data. Adelaide has a significantly smaller sample size (88 
decisions) compared to Sydney (1182 decisions). In fact, decisions from Sydney constitute over half of 
all decisions in the Database.  
The disparity in overturn rates amongst cities could also be explained by different proportions of 
Labor- and Liberal-appointed Members. As shown above at section 3.2, Labor-appointed Members 
overturn cases at a rate higher than Liberal-appointed Members. Therefore, a concentration of decisions 
by Labor-appointed Members in one city could increase the overturn rate for that city. When assessing 
 
163 Bingham, "The rule of law." 
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the data, this hypothesis appears to hold true only for Adelaide, which overwhelmingly had decisions 
made by Labor-appointed Members (95.5%) and has a high overturn rate of 35.2% (See Table 7 and 
Figure 4). However, as noted, the low sample size from Adelaide limits the statistical power of this 
conclusion. Elsewhere, there appears to be little relationship between the number of Labor-appointed 
Members and higher overturn rates. In all other cities, Labor-appointed Members accounted for 
approximately one third of decisions, yet Perth had an overturn-rate that was above average (19.6%), 
whilst Sydney’s rate was significantly lower (13.5%). It is, therefore, unclear whether the disparity in 
overturn rates between cities can be explained by different concentrations of Labor-appointed Members.   
Table 7 Cross-tabulation showing decision outcomes for each city 
  Affirmed Overturned Total 
Adelaide Count 57 31 88 
% 64.8% 35.2% 100.0% 
Brisbane Count 121 24 145 
% 83.4% 16.6% 100.0% 
Melbourne Count 585 170 755 
% 77.5% 22.5% 100.0% 
Perth Count 82 20 102 
% 80.4% 19.6% 100.0% 
Sydney Count 1023 159 1182 
% 86.5% 13.5% 100.0% 
Total Total Count 1868 404 2272 
 % 82.2% 17.8% 100.0% 
 
A more likely reason for the disparity in approval rates may be the clustering of cultural and ethnic 
groups in certain cities. The literature on asylum seeker settlement in Australia recognises that ethnic 
groups of asylum seekers tend to cluster in particular areas and cities.164 Given that the applicant’s 
 
164 John De Maio et al., "Building a new life in Australia: introducing the longitudinal study of humanitarian 
migrants," Family Matters, no. 94 (2014); Helen L. Blake, Laura Bennetts Kneebone, and Sharynne McLeod, 
"The impact of oral English proficiency on humanitarian migrants' experiences of settling in Australia," 
International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism 22, no. 6 (2019). 
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country of origin is the most significant factor in determining decision outcomes (as discussed below), 
approval rates are better explained by the fact that cultural groups that are less likely to receive asylum 
(such as Malaysians, Chinese or Indian applicants) are overwhelmingly situated in Sydney. The data 
supports this inference; for example, 82% of Chinese applicants and 89% of Nepalese applicants in the 
Database had their decisions determined in Sydney. Higher overturn rates in cities such as Melbourne 
can also be explained by country clustering. For example, 60% of cases from Afghanistan (which has 
an extremely high overturn rate of 71%) were located in Melbourne. 
Figure 4 Graph showing decision outcomes and the place that the decision was made. 
 
3.5.1 Multicollinearity 
The concentration of certain countries in particular cities creates a problem for the regression 
analysis as it results in multicollinearity. Multicollinearity occurs where there is a dependent 
relationship between explanatory variables; it has been described as “the thousand pounds monster in 
statistical modelling.” 165 The fact that applicants from the same country cluster in the same city means 
that the model may be unable to separate the effect of country of origin from the effect of the place of 
 
165 Habshah Midi, S. K. Sarkar, and Sohel Rana, "Collinearity diagnostics of binary logistic regression model," 
Journal of Interdisciplinary Mathematics 13, no. 3 (2010). 
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decision.  In order to avoid these problems, the place variable is left out of the logistic regression 
analysis. Whilst this means that insights into regional variations in overturn rates are not measured in 
the model, the overall reliability of the model is increased. 
3.6 POLICY – PAM3 UPDATE 
There was no statistically significant change in how decisions were made after the introduction of 
the new PAM3 Ministerial Direction. As Table 8 shows, the overturn rate was only marginally lower 
after the introduction of the new Policy (1.7%). Chi-squared testing confirms that the variables are 
independent (!"(1) = 1.088, p < 0.297). This indicates that the new guidelines in the PAM3 policy did 
not have an impact on the outcome of cases. Whilst it is difficult to say for certain why this is the case, 
several reasons can be speculated. It is possible that Members do not rely heavily on the PAM3 
guidelines. Whilst most of the judgements published include some reference to the PAM3 policy, or an 
acknowledgement that the Member reviewed the relevant policies in coming to the decision, this may 
be tokenistic. Indeed, in the author’s personal experience at refugee hearings at the AAT, Members 
have been reticent and often dismissive of Ministerial Directions altogether.166 It is possible that 
Members see the PAM3 policy as primarily intended for non-legal administrative decision-makers in 
the Department, whilst they are able to interpret the legislation themselves, without the assistance of 
the Policy. Indeed, this is a positive trend for the rule of law, given that where a Ministerial Direction 
is inconsistent with the Act, it is invalid and should not be read.167 
This finding goes against the speculation of Ng, who asserts that the Ministerial Directions are 
significant vessels through which political influence can structurally (rather than ideologically) infect 
decision-making at the Tribunal.168 Further possibilities for structural political influence are noted in the 
next chapter. 
 
 
166 The author has experience as a refugee case worker, and has assisted at the AAT several times.  
167 Riddell v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1993) 42 FCR 443 
168 Ng, "Tribunal independence in an age of migration control." 
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Table 8 Cross-tabulation of decision outcomes and the presence of the new PAM3 Policy., which came into effect on 1 July 
2017. 
 Affirmed Overturned Total 
Old 
PAM3 
Count 987 225 1212 
%  81.4% 18.6% 100.0% 
New 
PAM3 
Count 881 179 1060 
%  83.1% 16.9% 100.0% 
Total Count 1868 404 2272 
%  82.2% 17.8% 100.0% 
Additionally, when assessing the ‘Party Appointing’ variable in conjunction with the PAM3 
variable, there appeared to be no significant difference between how Liberal- and Labor-appointed 
members made decisions after the updated policy was introduced. (See Figure 5) This is promising for 
the rule of law and the impartiality of the Members at the AAT. The hypothesis that Liberal appointed 
Members would aggressively implement the wishes of the Minister by tightening security concerns and 
focussing on the character details of the applicants may therefore be untrue. However, it may be that 
ideological Members are implementing the Party’s wishes even before the policy was published. 
Figure 5 Graph showing the overturn rate for Liberal- and Labor-Appointed Members under the old and new PAM3 Policy. 
Data labels show the number of decisions. 
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3.7 LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
In order to test the variables simultaneously, so as to understand their significance in relation to each 
other, regression analysis was conducted. As explained in section 2.6.1, I take only the top 15 countries 
in the Database (where N > 30). The sample size of this dataset is 1923 cases (constituting 85% of 
decisions in the Database), which is sufficient for logistic regression. The binary dependent variable 
was the outcome of the decision (0 = affirmed, 1 = overturned).  The independent variables were the 
Party Appointing the Member (Party Appointing) (0 = Liberal, 1 = Labor); the gender of the Member 
(0 = female, 1 = male); the presence of the new PAM3 policy (0 = old policy, 1 = updated policy); the 
average country overturn rate for all AAT asylum decisions (Country Overturn Rate) (probability 
between 0 and 1 measured as a continuous variable) and the freedom house score (average of 2015-
2018, measured as a continuous variable between 0 and 7). As noted in section 0, the ‘Place of Decision’ 
is not included in the regression analysis due to issues of multicollinearity. The results are presented 
below in Table 9. 
This table suggests that some variables have significant effects on decision-outcomes, including the 
Party Appointing. The Nagelkerke R2 value (R2 = .280) indicates that the model was reasonably well-
fitted to the data.169 The Party Appointing variable is statistically significant (p < 0.05). The exp(β) 
value of 1.458 indicates that the odds of a decision being overturned increase by 1.458 times when 
the case is determined by a Labor-appointed Member.170 These results imply that politicised 
appointments of Members at the AAT are having an effect on decision-outcomes, at least for countries 
that appear frequently at the Tribunal. They are also in line with the findings on political decision-
making in the US and Canada.171 
  
 
169 The Nagelkerke R2 value attempts to generate a goodness of fit statistic for logistic regression. It cannot be 
interpreted as a proportion of variance explained by the model (as in ordinary least squares regression). Whilst it 
is a generally accepted method of calculating goodness of fit in the statistical literature, it has also been 
criticised for being an ad hoc method of evaluating a model, and should be interpreted with caution. See, 
Allison, P. (2012). Logistic regression using SAS: theory and application (2nd ed.). Cary, NC: SAS Pub. 68-72. 
170 Results are expressed in terms of ‘odds ratios’ because this is the most intuitive way of reporting results of 
logistic regression. For further discussion see section 3.7. 
171 Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag, "Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication."; Miller, 
Keith, and Holmes, Immigration Judges and U.S. Asylum Policy; Rehaag, "Judicial review of refugee 
determinations: the luck of the draw?." 
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Table 9 Regression results for countries where N > 30. Nagelkerke R2 = .278. N = 1923; SE = standard error; df = degrees 
of freedom; Wald = Wald chi-square test;  Sig. = p value; Exp(β) = exponential of β. Note: As the model is a logistic 
regression, the β coefficient represents the change in log odds for each unit change. This is not intuitive to interpret. 
Therefore, the exponential of β will be reported (exp(βk), which represents the odds ratio for each unit change. 
 β SE Wald df Sig. Exp(β) 
Party Appointing 0.377 0.148 6.526 1 0.011 1.458 
Gender -0.111 0.144 0.589 1 0.443 0.895 
New PAM3 -0.014 0.156 0.008 1 0.931 0.986 
Average Freedom 
House Score 
4.269 1387.805 0.000 1 0.998 71.446 
Country:       
 Vietnam     185.262 14 0.000   
Afghanistan 2.221 173.476 0.000 1 0.990 9.214 
Bangladesh 8.066 2775.610 0.000 1 0.998 3184.469 
China -3.965 693.902 0.000 1 0.995 0.019 
Egypt 1.960 520.427 0.000 1 0.997 7.096 
Fiji 9.314 3816.463 0.000 1 0.998 11091.671 
India 13.235 4857.317 0.000 1 0.998 559711.0 
Indonesia 11.080 4163.414 0.000 1 0.998 64853.428 
Iran 0.337 0.414 0.661 1 0.416 1.400 
Iraq 2.878 520.427 0.000 1 0.996 17.772 
Lebanon 5.139 1908.232 0.000 1 0.998 170.516 
Malaysia 6.924 2775.609 0.000 1 0.998 1016.882 
Nepal 7.104 3469.512 0.000 1 0.998 1217.118 
Pakistan 6.626 2081.707 0.000 1 0.997 754.248 
Sri Lanka 7.792 2775.610 0.000 1 0.998 2421.799 
Constant -26.629 8326.828 0.000 1 0.997 0.000 
 
As expected, the country of origin variable is statistically significant, as shown in the ‘Vietnam’ row 
(p < 0.05), as Vietnam is the reference category.172 The high Wald value (Wald = 185.26) also indicates 
 
172 When testing categorical variables in logistic regression, one category is chosen to be the reference category, 
and therefore is not included in the regression model. The overall significance of that variable on the model is 
shown in the Vietnam row. 
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that the impact of the country of origin variable on decision-outcomes is very high. The high p value 
for each of the other countries (p ≈ 1) is because when testing categorical dependent variables in logistic 
regression, the β coefficient represents the difference between the reference category (Vietnam) and the 
other category. Such considerations are not applicable to this data, as an analysis of the comparative 
effects of each country of origin on decision-outcomes when compared to Vietnam is both irrelevant 
and not meaningful. Rather, only the overall effect of the variable as a whole (as shown in the Vietnam 
row) is useful.  
The effect of Gender and the new PAM3 policy were, however, insignificant (p>.05). This confirms 
the chi-squared testing of these variables, which found that they had no relationship with decision-
outcomes. The effect of the Freedom House score was also insignificant (p>.05). This indicates that 
there is not necessarily a correlation between whether a country is considered sufficiently dangerous 
for a successful refugee claim, and the Freedom House score. For example, China had a very high 
Freedom House score average (6.5 out of 7), but had a very low overturn rate (6% of Chinese applicants 
at the AAT were successful).  
3.8 CONCLUSION 
The regression results indicate that there is a relationship between the political party appointing the 
Member and the decision-outcome for the 15 countries that appear most frequently in the Database 
(where N > 30). I can therefore state that H1 (‘Liberal-appointed Members will overturn cases at a lower 
rate than Labor-appointed Members’) can be accepted. The odds of a decision being overturned 
increase by 1.46 times where determined by a Labor-appointed Member (controlling for other 
variables). Returning to the research question, this indicates that Member’s political influences do have 
an impact on decision outcomes for asylum outcomes at the AAT between 2015 and 2018.  This finding 
affirms the fears mentioned above and is an indictment on the independence of the AAT and the system 
of appointment, which appears to be politicised. The finding indicates that the outcome of an asylum 
seekers’ case is determined not by the merits of their case, but by the Member that is allocated to their 
case and the political party that appointed that Member. The significance of this finding in relation to 
the literature will be discussed in the subsequent chapter. 
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4 Conclusions and Discussion 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
This study has found that the political preferences of Members at the AAT have a statistically 
significant effect on refugee decision outcomes. When controlling for other variables, the odds of a 
Labor-appointed Member overturning a case were 1.46 times higher than those of a Liberal-appointed 
Member, for the top 15 countries in the Database. This finding is important because it proves that the 
outcome of a case is not solely dependent on the merits of the asylum seeker’s application, but also on 
the political affiliations of the Member that happens to be assigned to the case. This undermines the 
rule of law and endangers the reliability and validity of decisions at the AAT, therefore diminishing the 
quality of justice. From an asylum decision-making perspective, it proves that the personal preferences 
of the decision-maker influence their reasoning process and the decision-outcome. Additionally, the 
results of this study indicate that governments will override fundamental principles of the Westminster 
system of government (such as an independent justice system, the rule of law and the separation of 
powers) in order to achieve their policy goals, at least in relation to asylum policy. Finally, from a 
methodological perspective, this study has contributed a new means of measuring the presence of 
political bias in the ‘black box’ of administrative tribunals. This is a fundamentally difficult task. 
Barriers of privacy, security and impartiality render assessment of refugee decision-making challenging 
for researchers.173 
This Conclusion discusses the results of this thesis in order to understand the findings and locate 
them within the literature on asylum decision-making, judicial behaviour and administrative studies. I 
address possible reasons for why Liberal-appointed Members overturn cases at a lower rate than Labor-
appointed Members and then explain why asylum decision-making at the AAT is politicised. Finally, I 
outline my general contributions to the literature, summarise the limitations of this study and note 
opportunities for further study. 
 
173 Tomkinson, "Who are you afraid of and why? Inside the black box of refugee tribunals." 
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4.2 UNDERSTANDING THE FINDINGS 
4.2.1 What explains the overturn rate disparity? 
The Liberal Party policy on refugees can be characterised as restrictive. As noted in section 1.4, the 
Liberal Party has a strong deterrence approach to asylum seekers174 and a clear, strict and longstanding 
policy of restricting Australia’s refugee intake. 175 Additionally, the Party does not like decisions of the 
Department being overturned at the AAT, as shown by the public criticism from Liberal MPs of several 
AAT decisions that overturned visa denials from the Department. 176 The finding that Liberal-appointed 
Members overturn cases at a lower rate could therefore be explained by their tendency to prioritise party 
policy over the humanitarian concerns of the asylum seeker or international law. This is in line with the 
realist school of asylum decision-making theory. 177  How this phenomenon actually occurs though, is 
unknown. It is possible that Liberal-appointed Members actively and consciously make decisions with 
the Party policy in mind. However, it is more likely that political preferences influence decision-making 
subversively or subconsciously. This would mean that Members with Liberal Party-aligned policy 
preferences are more likely to have a stricter approach to assessing asylum claims, as this is in line with 
their personal views on how Australia should determine refugee claims.  
The high overall overturn rate of Labor-appointed Members (22.3%) is more difficult to explain. It 
could indicate that decision-makers who are politically opposed to the Party in power may make 
decisions in a manner that disrupts their policy goals. Therefore, Labor-appointed Members overturn 
more refugee cases in order to both push back against the Liberal Party’s restrictive asylum policies and 
achieve the domestic policy goals of the Labor Party of expanding the refugee intake. This explanation 
aligns with realist conceptions of asylum decision-making. However, it is also possible that the high 
overturn rate is driven by a higher regard for human rights norms and an altruistic concern for the 
 
174 Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan, "The end of the deterrence paradigm? Future directions for global refugee 
policy."; Sharon Pickering and Leanne Weber, "New deterrence scripts in Australia's rejuvenated offshore 
detention regime for asylum seekers," Law & Social Inquiry 39, no. 4 (2014). 
175 See Phillips, A comparison of Coalition and Labor government asylum policies in Australia since 2001. 
176 Gribbin, "Peter Dutton blames 'politics' as bid to deport six refugees fails." 
177 Rosenblum and Salehyan, "Norms and interests in US asylum enforcement," 681. See section 1.3.1.3 for 
further discussion. 
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applicant.178 Labor-appointed Members may be more receptive to the principles of international human 
rights law (such as the right to freedom from arbitrary detention) and refugee law (such as the principle 
of non-refoulement), and therefore be more sympathetic to asylum claims. Such an explanation aligns 
with constructivist theories of asylum decision-making, which emphasise the ‘normative concerns’ of 
the humanitarian needs of asylum seekers and international human rights principles.179 
Further evidence of politicised decision-making is seen when comparing intra-country disparities in 
how Liberal- and Labor Members overturn decisions. As noted at section 3.3.1, there was a low 
disparity between overturn rates for East Asian countries (including Bangladesh, China, India, 
Indonesia and Nepal). The apparent bipartisan approach to major trading partners such as China, India 
and Indonesia (which all had very low overturn rates of around 6%) indicates that both Liberal- and 
Labor-appointed Members may be unwilling to offend the governments of those countries, in fear of 
endangering diplomatic or trade relations. Whilst it could be said that the low grant rates for these 
countries are simply due to a high proportion of weak refugee claims, this is unlikely to be true when 
considering that other host countries, such as Canada and the USA have high acceptance rates for 
Chinese and Indian applicants.180 
In contrast, there was a wide disparity in how Labor- and Liberal-appointed Members determined 
applications from Middle Eastern countries (see section 3.3.1 and Figure 2). The disparity indicates that 
personal preferences have an influence on outcomes. As noted by Thomas, country information and 
country status reports can be subject to biased interpretation, influenced by the political preferences of 
the decision-maker. 181 Due to the unstable nature of many of these countries and their sometimes-
fraught relationship with Australia, the possibility for politicised decision-making is even higher. 
However, when assessing the countries with high disparities against the Parties’ policies on 
 
178 Risse-Kappen et al., The power of human rights: International norms and domestic change, 66; Keck and 
Sikkink, Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Hamlin reports that in 2009 the acceptance rates for the US, Canada and Australia were as follows: China: 
35% (US), 58% (CAN), 14% (AUS); India: 27% (US), 33% (CAN), 2% (AUS). See further Hamlin, 
"International Law and Administrative Insulation: A Comparison of Refugee Status Determination Regimes in 
the United States, Canada, and Australia," 935. 
181 Robert Thomas, "Consistency in Asylum Adjudication: Country Guidance and the Asylum Process in the 
United Kingdom," International Journal of Refugee Law 20, no. 4 (2008). 
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international relations, no clear decision-making pattern emerged that could be explained. Further study 
is therefore required to confirm these findings with larger sample sizes and to better assess whether the 
international relations policies of appointing parties affects asylum decision-making at the AAT. 
Ultimately, an accurate theorisation of asylum decision-making is unlikely to be singular. Recent 
studies from US asylum literature indicate that decisions are likely shaped by both normative and 
national interest concerns, which interplay with the personal policy preferences of the decision-
maker.182 Additionally, the design of this study does not allow for definitive conclusions that confirm 
whether Liberal-appointed Members prioritise Party interests over the rights of asylum seekers. This 
study, therefore, gives a strong rationale for further quantitative investigation that codes and measures 
the motivations behind asylum decisions, as has been conducted recently by Miller et al.183 
4.2.2 What the results tell us about administrative decision-making? 
How does the result of this study challenge understandings of decision-making in general? Through 
the lens of judicial behaviour and administrative studies literature, the results of this study are important 
at both a national level and as evidence of politicised decision-making at an administrative tribunal. 
When talking about corruption and a politicised judicial system, countries that come to mind are 
politically turbulent, ruled by despots or have weak protections of the separation of powers and the rule 
of law. Australia is not one of them. Whilst there is a comprehensive literature on politicised decision-
making in US Courts and Tribunals, such studies are extremely uncommon in European and Australian 
courts.184 It is generally assumed that the decision-making bodies in the European and Westminster 
judicial systems are sufficiently unbiased and depoliticised.185 This thesis, however, indicates that the 
opposite is true, at least for asylum decision-making at the AAT; an expressly politicised appointment 
 
182 See Keith, Holmes, and Miller, "Explaining the Divergence in Asylum Grant Rates among Immigration 
Judges: An Attitudinal and Cognitive Approach."; Miller, Keith, and Holmes, Immigration Judges and U.S. 
Asylum Policy; Andy J. Rottman, Christopher J. Fariss, and Steven C. Poe, "The Path to Asylum in the US and 
the Determinants for Who Gets In and Why," International Migration Review 43, no. 1 (2009); Rosenblum and 
Salehyan, "Norms and interests in US asylum enforcement." 
183 Miller, Keith, and Holmes, Immigration Judges and U.S. Asylum Policy. 
184 See the Theory review at section 1.3.1. 
185 See Bleich, "Historical Institutionalism and Judicial Decision-Making."; Dyevre, "Unifying the field of 
comparative judicial politics: towards a general theory of judicial behaviour." 
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process is not a prerequisite for politicised decision-making. It also demonstrates that politicisation of 
decision-making can occur even in countries that have a historically strong respect for an independent 
justice system, in line with the Westminster tradition; 186 a point that could be tested across other venues 
of administrative and judicial review. Given that the justice system hinges on the impartiality and 
independence of our decision-makers, this concern is significant. Whilst the results of this thesis do not 
indicate that all decision-makers or decision-making venues are politicised, it gives a strong rationale 
for the further investigation into this understudied topic. 
 This study is one of the first studies into an administrative Tribunal, rather than into judicial Courts. 
Politicised decision-making is well established in Courts, especially the higher-level courts such as the 
US Supreme Court187 and to a lesser extent at the Australian High Court,188 which primarily deal with 
abstract legal questions for which there is a great variability in how the reasoning may proceed.  These 
courts also generally hear controversial constitutional issues, which are often inherently political. 
Finding that there is political bias in refugee decision-making at a Tribunal level, however, means that 
judicial behaviour theories may also be applied in administrative contexts, where the decision-maker is 
dealing primarily with factual questions that are not necessarily in the public eye. In line with the 
administrative studies literature, this study indicates that Tribunal Members can be conceptualised as 
front-line bureaucrats, such as social-workers or border control officers.189 This study confirms the 
findings of the administrative studies literature, which has long recognised the influence of personal 
preferences on the exercise of discretion in immigration and social-security scenarios.190 
 
186 On the importance of judicial independence in Australia, see Gerard Carney, "The Separation of Powers in 
the Westminster System," Queensland Chapter of the Australasian Study of Parliament Group, Speech given at 
Parliamentary Annexe, Brisbane 13 (1993). 
187 Segal, The Supreme Court and the attitudinal model. h 
188 Smyth, "The role of attitudinal, institutional and environmental factors in explaining variations in the dissent 
rate on the High Court of Australia."  
189 Lipsky, Street-level bureaucracy : dilemmas of the individual in public services.  
190 Søren C. Winter, "Explaining street-level bureaucratic behavior in social and regulatory policies" (2002 
2002); Norma M. Riccucci and Marcia K. Meyers, "Linking passive and active representation: The case of 
frontline workers in welfare agencies," Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 14, no. 4 (2004); 
Helena O. Stensöta, "Political influence on street-level bureaucratic outcome: Testing the interaction between 
bureaucratic ideology and local community political orientation," Journal of public administration research and 
theory 22, no. 3 (2011); Lael R. Keiser, "Understanding street-level bureaucrats' decision making: Determining 
eligibility in the social security disability program," Public Administration Review 70, no. 2 (2010). 
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4.2.3 Causes of political influence at the AAT  
The finding that political preferences of decision-makers affect asylum outcomes at the AAT 
challenges the conventional understanding of decision-making held by the public. As an independent 
Tribunal, decisions at the AAT should not be determined by political inclinations of the Member, but 
by the objective application of law to facts. This is fundamental to the rule of law and to the AAT’s 
purpose, which is to provide access to justice for persons aggrieved by a government decision. This 
section attempts to explain how refugee decisions at the AAT have become politicised. I argue it is due 
to both the institutional nature of the AAT as an avenue of administrative review (as opposed to judicial 
review) and also the recent politicisation and securitisation of refugee issues in Australia and globally.  
One cause is the design of the AAT. It is a quasi-judicial decision-making body that is controlled by 
the executive, and is therefore particularly vulnerable to being exposed to political manipulation. From 
an institutional perspective, the AAT is not insulated from political criticism and manipulation. Unlike 
the judiciary, the AAT is unable to recommend the criminal prosecution of persons who criticise it.191 
Additionally, non-lawyers may be appointed to the Tribunal as Members. The only requirement is that 
the Member “in the opinion of the Governor-General, has special knowledge or skills relevant to the 
duties of a … member.”192  This means that political parties are less constrained in who they may appoint 
to tribunals than to courts. Outside of institutional protections, the discourse of independence and 
impartiality that surrounds the judiciary is not as strong or widespread for the AAT. Whilst the media 
and civil society generally appreciate the importance of an independent judiciary, and are quick to 
defend the courts from public criticism or political pressure, the same backlash has not occurred for 
criticism of the AAT.193 Politicians may therefore be less hesitant to exert influence over the AAT, as it 
does not result in a loss of favour in the eyes of voters. The lack of these institutional and cultural 
 
191 The judiciary is protected from criticism via the common law offence of ‘contempt by scandalising the 
court’, which allows the prosecution of an individual for 'any act done or writing published calculated to bring a 
court or a judge of the court into contempt, or to lower his authority.' See also R v Gray [1900] 2 QB 36; A. 
Caillard, "Scandalizing the Court," Melbourne University Law Review 14 (1983); Oyiela Litaba, "Does the 
'offence' of contempt by scandalising the court have a valid place in the law of modern day Australia?," Deakin 
Law Review 8, no. 1 (2003). 
192 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act (Cth) 1975, s 6(3)(b). 
193 Note the recent attention received by the AAT since July 2019, which corresponds with the publication of the 
Callinan Report. 
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protections, coupled with recognised trends towards the expansion and concentration of executive 
power,194 has meant that the AAT is more open politicisation. 
Also underpinning the politicisation of refugee decisions at the AAT is the trend towards reframing 
political discourse on refugees through a paradigm of securitisation and criminalisation.195 Gale 
recognises that post 9/11, asylum policy in Australia has been implemented through the lens of ‘border 
protection’ rather than humanitarian concern. 196 Under this new paradigm, the Australian government 
is able to justify asylum policies that breach international law and the human rights of detainees, such 
as offshore detention and boat turn-backs.197 Van Berlo notes that the implementation of asylum policy 
is justified using a discourse of sovereignty and crime. 198 For example, ‘Operation Sovereign Borders’, 
which created a militarised coast guard, is required for “protecting Australia’s borders and national 
sovereignty against transnational crime.” 199 By reframing refugee issues in language of national 
security, preventing crime and protecting Australia’s sovereignty, governments are able to implement 
and justify policies that would otherwise be unpalatable. The high stakes of national security and 
effectiveness of asylum policy in garnering votes has meant that political parties are prepared to break 
from traditional norms of privacy and human rights in order to achieve their policy goals.200  
 
194 See Phil Larkin and John Uhr, "Bipartisanship, partnership and bicameralism in Australia’s ‘war on terror’: 
forcing limits on the extension of executive power," in The War on Terror and the Growth of Executive Power? 
(Routledge, 2010). 
195 On national security, Richard Devetak, "In fear of refugees: The politics of border protection in Australia," 
The International Journal of Human Rights 8, no. 1 (2004).; On crimmigration, Peter Billings, "Regulating 
crimmigrants through the ‘character test’: exploring the consequences of mandatory visa cancellation for the 
fundamental rights of non-citizens in Australia," Crime, Law and Social Change 71, no. 1 (2018). 
196 Peter Gale, "The refugee crisis and fear: Populist politics and media discourse," Journal of sociology 40, no. 
4 (2004). 
197 See Helen Davidson and Saba Vasefi, "UN body says Australia breached human rights laws and needs to 
review Migration Act," The Guardian (Australia) 2018; Natalie Klein, "Assessing Australia's push back the 
boats policy under international law: Legality and accountability for maritime interceptions of irregular 
migrants," Melb. J. Int'l L. 15 (2014). 
198 Patrick van Berlo, "Australia’s Operation Sovereign Borders: Discourse, Power, and Policy from a 
Crimmigration Perspective," Refugee Survey Quarterly 34, no. 4 (2015). 
199 Ibid, 85. 
200 Andrew Lynch, Nicola McGarrity, and George Williams, Counter-terrorism and beyond: the culture of law 
and justice after 9/11 (Routledge, 2010); Lisa Burton, Nicola McGarrity, and George Williams, "The 
extraordinary questioning and detention powers of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation," Melb. UL 
Rev. 36 (2012); Nicola McGarrity and Jessie Blackbourn, "Anti-terrorism laws and human rights," The 
Routledge International Handbook of Criminology and Human Rights  (2016). 
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Returning to the results of this thesis, it appears that a similar phenomenon is occurring in the AAT. 
The government can justify its politicisation of the appointment process as means of ensuring that 
decisions of the Department are not overturned, despite its denigrating effect on the fundamental norms 
of the Westminster system of government (i.e. the separation of powers and the rule of law. From a 
behavioural perspective, the results also indicate that the reframing of asylum issues has changed the 
way that Members evaluate competing considerations in deciding claims. The lower overturn rate by 
Liberal-appointed Members could be explained by their increased emphasis on national security 
concerns over the humanitarian rights of asylum seekers. As noted above, however, such conclusions 
would require more specific analysis of the motivations Members’ decisions in order to be verified. 
4.3  OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis opens the opportunities for future research in several ways. First, the finding that 
decision-making varies significantly between Liberal- and Labor-appointed Members leads to the 
question of why? Whilst some attempts were made to theorise the cases of high and low overturn rates 
in this thesis, further research is required. Future investigations could introduce new variables into the 
Database, including basis of each applicant’s claim (e.g. based on gender, ethnicity or religion etc) and 
the factors considered by each Member in coming to their decision. This would also allow similar cases 
to be grouped together to more accurately test differences in how the personal characteristics of 
Members affect case outcomes, without differences in cases skewing the data.  
Future research could also collect biographical information on Members, to more accurately indicate 
their political preferences. The Party Appointing is not a perfect indicator of political ideology. It 
assumes the appointment process to be highly and reliably politicised. Whilst attempts to find 
biographical information on the Members were not fruitful (See Appendix 1), recent media 
investigations have placed public pressure on decision-makers to be transparent in their political 
inclinations.201 It is therefore possible that more biographical data will come to light as judicial bias is 
questioned by the media and in politics.  
 
201 David Hardaker, "The Big Stack; How the goernment stacked the AAT." 
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The third and most significant area of future investigation is into structural or institutional avenues 
of political influence. A limitation of this quantitative study is that it only considered the effects of 
effects of the attitudes of decision-makers and of one policy (New PAM3). The AAT, as a hybrid 
executive-judicial body, has unique institutional features that make it prone to political influence unlike 
in judicial contexts. For example, future qualitative research could look into the influence of 
bureaucratic considerations, such as number of cases finalised, financial performance, total revenue, 
expenditure, assets and liquidity, which are all required to be reported annually.202 Another possible 
area of analysis is the effect of the political attitudes of registry and support staff at the AAT. The size 
and influence of the support staff at the AAT was heavily criticised in the Callinan Report, which stated 
“[r]egrettably, the Registry staff are more numerous than they could and should be, and their 
relationship with the Members is unduly managerial, on occasions even overbearing, and not as 
conducive as it should be to the Members’ independence and efficiency in carrying out their hard 
duties.”203 There are, however, significant methodological challenges in measuring the effect of the 
registry on decision-outcomes, either using quantitative or qualitative methods, that would need to be 
overcome. 
  
 
202 Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act (Cth) 2013, s 39(1)(a). 
203 Callinan, Statutory Review of the Tribunals Amalgamation Act 2015, 47. 
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4.4 CONCLUSION 
[T]here is no liberty if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and 
executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be 
exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to 
the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression. 
Montesquieu (1748) The Spirit of the Laws, Book XI 
Whilst Montesquieu’s warning is dramatically phrased, the findings of this study confirm concerns 
over the fusion of the executive and judicial function in administrative refugee decision-making in 
Australia. This thesis has used an innovative method in order to measure and prove that political 
preferences of Members have a statistically significant effect on decision outcomes at the AAT. Given 
the vulnerability of many asylum seekers this finding should not be taken lightly. This study provides 
further evidence for the reform of the appointment process at the AAT and for new means of ensuring 
that political bias does not afflict decisions. Such measures have already been called for in legal 
circles.204 Beyond this call for reform, however, this thesis has made the following empirical, 
methodological and theoretical contributions: 
From an empirical perspective, this study makes a significant contribution: the research 
underpinning it has created, for the first time, a comprehensive Database of all refugee cases published 
by the AAT between 2015 and 2018. Methodologically, it has developed a solution to the recognised 
problem of gaining reliable and valid information on the influence of political bias in decision 
making.205 Drawing off studies in the US and adapting them to the context of an Australian Tribunal, 
this thesis develops a method that is able to compare how Members of different political preferences 
determine cases. 
The analysis of the Database also leads to clear and important findings: Controlling for the effects 
of the applicant’s country of origin and its political status, the gender of the Member, the place the 
decision was made and the effect of a change in policy, this thesis found that the odds of a Labor-
appointed Member overturning a case were 1.46 times higher than those of a Liberal-appointed 
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Member. The study also found that whilst Labor- and Liberal-appointed Members determine cases in a 
similar manner for some regions, other regions (the Middle East in particular) were treated very 
differently by Members. Finally, analysis of the data constructed for this thesis indicates with a 
statistically reliable degree of confidence that the gender of the Member and the new PAM3 Policy had 
no significant effect on decision-outcomes. This Database can be further analysed using additional 
variables or alternate techniques to give a deeper understanding to asylum decision-making. 
The thesis also enhances our theoretical understanding of decision-making. It provides evidence for 
the attitudinal school of judicial behaviour theory and indicates realist explanations of refugee decision-
making may be correct. Additionally, it indicates that phenomenon occurs in Australia and in an 
administrative tribunal setting.  
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Appendices  
APPENDIX 1: SAMPLE STUDY OF MEMBERS WITH PARTY LINKS 
As noted in chapter 2, other scholars have measured the political attitudes of judges and decision-
makers by collecting biographical information and data on their previous work experience. I attempted 
to conduct similar data in this study, however, was only able to find information on a small handful of 
Members. These results are presented here. 
A thorough investigation of all Members revealed that only the Members noted in Table A below 
had publicly available evidence of previous political activity. I only recorded biographical information 
or work experience that had a clear link to either the Liberal or Labor Parties. This included being a 
member of a Party, working for a Party or running for election for either Party.  Interestingly, and 
despite the author’s best efforts to find publicly available information, only evidence of Liberal-
appointed Members was found. This is in line with accusations in the media, and indicates that the 
Liberal Party has used the appointment process to appoint Members with links to the Party. Whilst it is 
possible that the Labor Party has taken a similar approach, the investigation found no such evidence of 
ex-Labor Party members sitting at the AAT.  
When collating all the decisions made by these Members, it creates a sample set of only 140 cases. 
The overturn rate for these Members was only 10% (whereas the average was 17.8%, and the average 
for Labor-appointed appointees was 22.3%). Whilst this sample is too small to draw definite 
conclusions on how Members with clearly evidenced political attitudes make decisions, it is indicative 
of ideological decision-making and provides a rationale for further study using biographical data. 
In searching for biographical data, Iused only publicly available online resourcs. This primarily 
involved using Google. My search term was as follows for each Member: “*Member Name*, *Party 
Appointing*, *Administrative Appeals Tribunal/LinkedIn*.” The primary source of information was 
news articles. 
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Table A Members with known associations with Political Parties. 
Member Name Associated with 
Political Party 
Explanation of link to Political Party 
Dr Denis Dragovic 
 
Liberal Failed in bid for Liberal preselection in the 
Victorian seat of Goldstein.206 
 
Saxon Rice  Liberal Served as a Queensland LNP MP for three 
years before losing seat at the 2015 state 
election.207 
 
Brendan Darcy Liberal Served as adviser to former Liberal 
defence minister Kevin Andrews.208 
 
David McCulloch 
 
Liberal Worked as a policy adviser to Liberal MP 
Paul Fletcher and as a staffer to former 
Liberal immigration minister Amanda 
Vanstone – and Michael Cooke, who was 
an adviser to Tony Abbott.209 
Ann Brandon-Baker 
 
Liberal Scott Morrison's chief of staff during his 
time as immigration minister.210 
Judith Troeth Liberal Was a Liberal Senator for Victoria from 
1993 – 2011.211 
 
Justin Meyer Liberal Was an adviser to former Victorian Liberal 
premiers Ted Baillieu and Dennis 
Napthine. Electoral records show that 
he donated more than $11,000 to the 
Liberal party in 2010-11.212 
Nicholas McGowan Liberal Ran as the Liberal candidate for the 
Victorian seat of Jagajaga in 2013.213  
  
 
206 https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/tim-wilson-heading-to-canberra-after-winning-safe-liberal-seat-of-
goldstein-20160319-gnmcmc.html 
207 https://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/members/former/bio?id=2282839184 
208 https://www.buzzfeed.com/markdistefano/a-brandis-stack 
209 https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/immigration/liberals-order-purge-of-refugee-review-body/news-
story/0e931937e67011a123897ea235461bb9 
210 https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/tony-abbott-lures-more-women-to-join-peta-credlin-as-political-
advisers/news-story/8f1d173fe5dd2e0975a31c59dab522fe 
211 https://www.aph.gov.au/Senators_and_Members/Parliamentarian?MPID=GX5 
212 https://periodicdisclosures.aec.gov.au/Returns/48/OMOC2.pdf 
213 https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/mammoth-task-for-nick-mcgowan-to-topple-jenny-macklin-in-
jagajaga-20130906-2t9hh.html 
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APPENDIX 2: REGIONAL DECISION RATES 
Middle East 
Table B Layered cross-tabulation showing the overturn rates for Labor- and Liberal-appointed Members for Middle Eastern 
Countries, N > 30. 
Country Affirmed Overturned Total 
Afghanistan Party Appointing Liberal 
 
Count 5 8 13 
% 38.5% 61.5% 100.0% 
Labor Count 16 44 60 
% 26.7% 73.3% 100.0% 
Total Count 21 52 73 
% 28.8% 71.2% 100.0% 
Egypt Party Appointing Liberal Count 28 14 42 
% 66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
Labor Count 14 10 24 
% 58.3% 41.7% 100.0% 
Total Count 42 24 66 
% 63.6% 36.4% 100.0% 
Iran Party Appointing Liberal Count 13 13 26 
% 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
Labor Count 16 3 19 
% 84.2% 15.8% 100.0% 
Total Count 29 16 45 
% 64.4% 35.6% 100.0% 
Iraq Party Appointing Liberal Count 7 12 19 
% 36.8% 63.2% 100.0% 
Labor Count 11 15 26 
% 42.3% 57.7% 100.0% 
Total Count 18 27 45 
% 40.0% 60.0% 100.0% 
Lebanon Party Appointing Liberal Count 31 9 40 
% 77.5% 22.5% 100.0% 
Labor Count 27 2 29 
% 93.1% 6.9% 100.0% 
Total Count 58 11 69 
% 84.1% 15.9% 100.0% 
Total Party Appointing Liberal Count 84 56 140 
% 60.0% 40.0% 100.0% 
Labor Count 84 74 158 
% 53.2% 46.8% 100.0% 
Total Count 168 130 298 
% 56.4% 43.6% 100.0% 
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Asia 
Table C Layered cross-tabulation showing the overturn rates for Labor- and Liberal-appointed Members for Middle Eastern 
Countries, N > 30. 
Country Affirmed Overturned Total 
Bangladesh Party Appointing Liberal Count 69 15 84 
% 82.1% 17.9% 100.0% 
Labor Count 33 10 43 
% 76.7% 23.3% 100.0% 
Total Count 102 25 127 
% 80.3% 19.7% 100.0% 
China Party Appointing Liberal Count 183 13 196 
% 93.4% 6.6% 100.0% 
Labor Count 84 4 88 
% 95.5% 4.5% 100.0% 
Total Count 267 17 284 
% 94.0% 6.0% 100.0% 
India Party Appointing Liberal Count 112 6 118 
% 94.9% 5.1% 100.0% 
Labor Count 45 5 50 
% 90.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 157 11 168 
% 93.5% 6.5% 100.0% 
Indonesia Party Appointing Liberal Count 22 2 24 
% 91.7% 8.3% 100.0% 
Labor Count 18 1 19 
% 94.7% 5.3% 100.0% 
Total Count 40 3 43 
% 93.0% 7.0% 100.0% 
Malaysia Party Appointing Liberal Count 273 14 287 
% 95.1% 4.9% 100.0% 
Labor Count 118 16 134 
% 88.1% 11.9% 100.0% 
Total Count 391 30 421 
% 92.9% 7.1% 100.0% 
Nepal Party Appointing Liberal Count 42 0 42 
% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Labor Count 42 1 43 
% 97.7% 2.3% 100.0% 
Total Count 84 1 85 
% 98.8% 1.2% 100.0% 
Pakistan Party Appointing Liberal Count 75 23 98 
% 76.5% 23.5% 100.0% 
Labor Count 22 24 46 
% 47.8% 52.2% 100.0% 
Total Count 97 47 144 
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% 67.4% 32.6% 100.0% 
Sri Lanka Party Appointing Liberal Count 80 14 94 
% 85.1% 14.9% 100.0% 
Labor Count 54 12 66 
% 81.8% 18.2% 100.0% 
Total Count 134 26 160 
% 83.8% 16.3% 100.0% 
Vietnam Party Appointing Liberal Count 28 7 35 
% 80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
Labor Count 21 13 34 
% 61.8% 38.2% 100.0% 
Total Count 49 20 69 
% 71.0% 29.0% 100.0% 
Total Party Appointing Liberal Count 884 94 978 
% 90.4% 9.6% 100.0% 
Labor Count 437 86 523 
% 83.6% 16.4% 100.0% 
Total Count 1321 180 1501 
% 88.0% 12.0% 100.0% 
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APPENDIX 3: FREEDOM HOUSE SCORE 
Method 
To calculate the average Freedom House Score, I used the Freedom House data, which presents each 
countries’ score on Civil and Political rights from 1973-2018. The raw Freedom House Data is publicly 
available online. 214 I then added the Civil and Political rights scores for the years in question (2015-
2018) and took their average. This was the score used in the regression. The scores for each country are 
presented below. 
Table of Scores 
Table D Average Freedom House Scores for each country in the database, as calculated using the method above. 
Country Freedom House 
Score Average 
Afghanistan 5.875 
Albania 3 
Algeria 5.5 
Bahrain 6.5 
Bangladesh 4 
Botswana 2.5 
Brazil 2 
Burma (Myanmar) 5.375 
Burundi 6.25 
Cambodia 5.5 
Cameroon 6 
Chad 6.5 
China 6.5 
Colombia 3.25 
Cote D'Ivoire 4.125 
Cuba 6.5 
Czech Republic 1 
Democratic Republic of Korea 2 
Egypt 5.625 
El Salvador 2.5 
Eritrea 7 
Estonia 1 
Ethiopia 6.375 
Fiji 3.25 
 
214 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Country%20and%20Territory%20Ratings%20and%20Statuses%20F
IW1973-2018.xlsx 
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Finland 1 
Georgia 3 
Germany 1 
Ghana 1.5 
Greece 2 
India 2.5 
Indonesia 3 
Iraq 5.625 
Ireland 1 
Israel 1.625 
Italy 1 
Japan 1 
Jordan 5.25 
Kenya 4 
Korea, Democratic People’s 
Republic of 
7 
Kyrgyzstan 5 
Laos, Peoples Democratic Rep 6.5 
Lebanon 4.625 
Liberia 3.375 
Libya 6.25 
Macedonia, Fmr Yugo Rep of 3.5 
Malawi 3.125 
Malaysia 4 
Mauritius 1.5 
Mexico 3 
Mongolia 1.5 
Nepal 3.5 
New Zealand 1 
Nigeria 4.25 
Pakistan 4.5 
Palestinian Terr. 
(W.Bank/Gaza) 
6 
Papua New Guinea 3.25 
Peru 2.5 
Philippines 3 
Poland 1.25 
Russian Federation 6.25 
Samoa 2 
Saudi Arabia 7 
Serbia 2.25 
Sierra Leone 3 
Singapore 4 
Solomon Islands 2.75 
South Africa 2 
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South Sudan 6.75 
Sri Lanka 4 
Stateless 
 
Sudan 7 
Sweden 1 
Syria 7 
Taiwan 1.25 
Tajikistan 6.375 
Thailand 5.5 
Tonga 2 
Turkey 4.25 
Uganda 5.375 
Ukraine 3 
United Kingdom 1 
United States of America 1.25 
Uzbekistan 7 
Vanuatu 2 
Venezuela 5.25 
Vietnam 6 
Zimbabwe 5.25 
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APPENDIX 5: ADDITIONAL METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND SAMPLE OF DATA 
 
The method for collating the database is described in detail in section 2.3. In addition to that description 
the following considerations should be noted. 
Collecting Cases from AustLii 
The AustLii database enables you to search cases from particular Tribunals and Courts. In my search, 
I included the following parameters: 
• Jurisdiction: Commonwealth 
• Court/Tribunal: Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
• Year: 2015-2018 
• Search Term: ‘Refugee’ in *Case Name* 
 
Each refugee case published on AustLii has the same naming convention, which includes the word 
‘Refugee’ in the Case Name. For example: “1710817 (Refugee) [2018] AATA 559”. Therefore, this 
search string allowed me to collect all refugee decisions at the AAT between 2015 and 2019. The URLs 
to all the cases were copied into an Excel spreadsheet. Then, a scraping code written on Google Chrome 
used the list of URLs to generate an additional spreadsheet of the following elements of each decision: 
(See Figure A for an example of a case on AustLii) 
• Case Number 
• Country of Reference 
• Member 
• Date 
• Place of Decision 
• Decision 
However, as each Member entered the information differently (especially for the ‘Decision’ section), 
all cases had to be checked by hand, to ensure the coding was reliable and consistent. 
 
 
 
  
99 
 
Figure A Screenshot of an example of a refugee case as it appears on AustLii. http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/AATA/2018/559.html 
 
Appointing Party of Each Member 
In order to determine the Appointing Party for each Member, I used the AAT Annual Reports. Each 
report includes an Appendix listing all Members and the year they were initially appointed. By cross-
referencing this information with the Political Party in power in power for that year, I was able to 
determine which Party appointed each Member.  
There were, however, several cases in which the Member sat on the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) 
before being appointed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. (The Tribunals were merged in July 
2015, at which point all Members were freshly appointed.)  For these Members, I took the Party that 
initially appointed them to the RRT. 
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